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Abstract 
 
This thesis conducts a close reading of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees’ “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within 
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees” – a document that explains how legal definitions of refugee status 
might take into account gender issues. In it, I investigate the relationship between gender 
identity and the refugee status to understand how gender is constructed in relation to 
other terms or identity categories that determine whether an individual will be granted 
asylum. Performing a close reading of this text, I demonstrate that the UNHCR defines 
gender as a ground that may influence or dictate violence. Defining gender in this way, 
the text betrays a performative contradiction. On the one hand, the UNHCR treats gender 
as a recognizable and distinct identity—one that can be separated from other identity 
categories. On the other hand, their inability to articulate clear terms for describing such a 
gender identity—to pin down the words with which they might express this bounded 
gender—suggests that gender is not a stable, confined, or separable identity category. 
This contradiction is significant because it draws our attention to the ways human rights 
instruments delineate the language and vocabulary available to people asserting a claim 
before the law. That is, the analysis conducted in this thesis demonstrates that there is a 
need to pay close attention to how international human rights instruments open and 
foreclose an individuals’ ability to account for their experiences and gain a voice in the 
law. 
 
 
  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………  v 
 
1. Introduction  
The Characteristics of a Refugee: Towards a Universal Definition…………….1  
 
1.A. Historical Overview……………………………………………………….……3 
 
1.B. The Universal Refugee Concept: Two Exigencies………………………….….5 
 
   1.B.1. The Space Between Citizenship and Humanity:  
The Refugee Concept and State Sovereignty………………………...…..6 
 
   1.B.2. Reading Law: Power and Interpretation………………………………..11 
1.C. Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………….…..18 
2. Literature Review 
Accounting for Gender: Feminist Engagements with Refugee Law……………22 
 
2.A. Including Women: From “Sidestreaming” to “Mainstreaming” of Gender…...24 
2.B. (Re)presenting Gender: Producing Femininities and Masculinities………...…30 
2.C. Textual Addition or Interpretive Inclusion?...………………………………….38   
2.D. Concluding Remarks: Outlining the Question and Research Plan ….…...……43 
3. Method 
The Methodology of Close Reading: Language and Power………………...……48 
 
3.A. Theoretical Background: The Social Function of Language……………...……49 
 
3.B. Techniques of Close Reading……………………………………………..….…54 
 
3.C. Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………...…….58 
  
     
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
4. Analysis 
The Discursive Construction of Gender as a ground  
in the UNHCR Guidelines………………………………………………………....59 
 
4.A. Framing the Issue of Gender Within Refugee Law………………………….…62 
 
4.B. Language: Articulating Gender Within Law…………………..………….……66 
 
4.C. The Relationship Between Gender and the Refugee Definition………………..72 
 
4.D. Concluding Remarks…………………………………………………..……….84  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Gendered Claims to Asylum: Issues and Possibilities..………………………….87 
  
5.A. Case Law………...……………………………………………………………..90 
 
5.B. Concluding Remarks: Human Rights as Narratives ……………………….…..97  
 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………...……104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
Acknowledgements 
 
I owe many thanks to all the people who helped and supported me throughout the writing 
of this thesis; those whom I could bounce ideas off of and discuss my topic with, and 
those who helped me articulate and structure those ideas into their finished form within 
this paper.   
 I owe much gratitude to my advisor, Sarah Burgess, who gave me thoughtful, 
thorough, and knowledgeable feedback, and who both challenged and supported me 
throughout this semester. She played an instrumental part in producing this work, and 
made me able to see clearer when I lost track of my direction. 
I also owe my continuous gratitude to friends and family, whom I can always 
count on –for both support and encouragement, and also for discussions and debates that 
challenge me and allow me to always develop my outlook on the world. To my parents: 
this thesis would not exist if not for your insight and engagement.  
Last but not least, a big thank you to the faculty and students in the MAIS 
program, not only for support and encouragement throughout this writing process, but 
also for a great year-and-a-half of lively discussions, engaging lectures, and the 
occasional late nights at the library. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
Chapter One - Introduction 
The Characteristics of the Refugee: Towards  
a Universal Definition 
 
The Second World War left in its wake a refugee crisis that necessitated the creation of 
international laws and policies. With over 30 million people left displaced and stateless 
(Barnett, 2002: 243), 51 nation-states came together in response to found the United 
Nations (UN) in 1945 – an inter-state institution established to prevent a potential third 
World War, creating and defining a space for international cooperation and dialogue. The 
existence of an intergovernmental platform such as this facilitated the recognition that the 
sheer numbers of displaced and fleeing persons required some form of coordinated and 
lasting global response (UNHCR, 2005: 5). This, in turn, necessitated the creation of a 
uniform standard for determining refugee status and deciding on the basic components of 
a claim to asylum. Responding to such concerns, the United Nations member states 
adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in July 1951 – an agreement 
that remains the core instrument within international asylum law to this day (UNHCR, 
2005: 9). This Convention codified both the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of 
states, and its adoption marks the establishment of the first permanent framework 
concerning refugees on an international scale.  
 
The 1951 Convention outlined for the first time the universal definition of “the refugee” 
within international law. It became apparent, however, that this seemingly neutral 
definition was, in fact, both written and read with a specific refugee in mind: the male, 
European, political dissident, fleeing an oppressive regime in the post-World War II 
context (Olivius, 2010: 3; Nyers, 1999: 25). Feminist engagements with refugee law have 
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since demonstrated how readings of the refugee definition have excluded the experiences 
of women from the scope of the Convention. This thesis, therefore, addresses the need 
within the literature to critically engage with the ways “gender” is constructed and read 
within documents defining refugee status. With the UNHCR’s 2002 guidelines that 
explain how to conduct a gender-inclusive interpretation of the refugee concept as the 
point of departure, this thesis therefore sets out to answer the question of how this 
guiding document establishes the relationship between gender and the refugee status. I 
argue that the Guidelines treats gender as a confined, stable ground from which violence 
emerges. However, there is a performative contradiction contained within the very 
language of the UNHCR Guidelines, the vocabulary the text employs in discussing and 
defining gender conflates various meanings and lived experiences. In other words, the 
language of this UNHCR publication itself betrays the ways that gender is not static or 
enclosed, but rather a complex, dynamic, and flexible category. 
 
This chapter begins such a study by defining the problem of the relation between gender 
and “the refugee” as a legal status. It does so by outlining the historical development of 
the Convention, and the scholarly controversy surrounding it. I mainly address the debate 
regarding the universal definition of “the refugee,” demonstrating how this concept and 
its interpretation have worked to exclude certain groups from the scope of the Convention. 
I argue that the existence of a universal definition has produced two exigencies. The first 
concerns the power of nation-states vis-à-vis the international community to apply 
autonomous understandings of the refugee definition, and the second concerns the way 
power may be exercised through acts of interpretation. Establishing the historical context 
the Convention and refugee definition was drafted within, and the scholarly debate that 
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has followed, will provide contextualization for the review of the literature that follows, 
and ultimately situates the rationale and background for my thesis question and research 
plan.     
 
1.A. Historical Overview 
The adoption of the 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee (hereafter the 
Convention) marked a watershed moment within the international regime of refugee 
protection. Not only did it represent a worldwide will to address the issue of displaced 
persons (UNHCR, 2005: 9), the Convention also endorsed one single definition of a 
“refugee,” as opposed to earlier instruments that had designated specific groups or 
populations as refugees (UNHCR, 2010: 3).1 The first article of the 1951 Convention 
holds that a refugee is someone who: 
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 2010: 14). 
 
An asylum seeker must in other words be able to establish multiple conditions: he or she 
must prove that the experience of fear amounts to persecution and that this fear is well-
founded – that the claimant’s subjective fear is backed up by “sufficient facts to permit 
the finding that the applicant faces a serious possibility of persecution” (Goodwin-Gill, 
1996: 41). Furthermore, the claimant must prove that this persecution is on account of, or 
                                                
1 All references to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, are according to the following document 
published by UNHCR: Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2010). Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html  
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in other words, because of, one or more of the altogether five enumerated grounds for 
persecution.2 The emphasis on a refugee as someone “outside the country of his 
nationality,” highlights the importance of, and respect for, territorial borders and 
sovereignty within this refugee regime, and establishes “the inability of an international 
organization to look within a nation’s borders” (Barnett, 2002: 246). 
 
The Convention designated a special role to the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which had been established a year earlier. This 
agency was created as the successor of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), and 
as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly (UNHCR, 2005: 7). Within the preamble 
to the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR is charged with the task of overseeing “the 
conventions providing for the protection of refugees”, and it is recognized that “the 
effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the 
co-operation of States with the High Commissioner” (UNHCR, 2010: 13). The UNHCR 
mandate, which has been expanded from its original formulation, is to “provide, on a 
non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek 
permanent solutions for them” (UNHCR, 2005: 7). The UNHCR is in charge of putting 
together international treaties and supervising their application” (Barnett, 2002: 247). 
 
Although the 1951 Convention marked a development towards a universal definition of 
the refugee concept, it still delineated clear limitations to its scope. Reflecting the 
“reluctance of States to sign a ‘blank cheque’ for unknown numbers of future refugees,” 
(Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website), the Convention contained 
                                                
2 The five protected Convention grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group and political opinion. 
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temporal and geographical restrictions to the criteria, limiting its application to those who 
had become refugees due to events taking place prior to January 1, 1951. Signatory states 
were furthermore given the option of limiting their obligations to those displaced because 
of events occurring before this time in Europe. This clearly demonstrates that the 
Convention was greatly influenced by the post-World War context it was adopted within 
(Barnett, 2002: 246), and constructed primarily with a certain type of displaced people in 
mind, namely the political refugee fleeing an oppressive state in the post-World War II 
context (Olivius, 2010: 3; UNHCR, 2005: 9).  
 
In the time after the establishment of the 1951 Convention, however, the UNHCR was 
involved in several events taking place outside of Europe, such as the refugee crises 
arising from the Chinese Communist revolution, Decolonization in Africa and Asia 
(Johnson, 2011: 1022), and the Algerian war for independence (UNHCR, 2005: 9). 
Recognizing that “new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted 
and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the 
Convention” (UNHCR, 2010: 46), a modifying protocol to the Convention was 
implemented in 1967. The protocol lifted the temporal and geographical limitations 
contained in the refugee definition, making its ambition truly universal in scope.  
 
1.B. The Universal Refugee Concept: Two Exigencies 
As the idea of universal human rights was developed in post-war Europe, the 
international community sought to extend such rights to fleeing and displaced persons by 
delineating the universal rights and conditions of “the refugee.” The characteristics and 
entitlements of the refugee, as well as the responsibilities of nation states, were 
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subsequently established in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The appearance 
of such guiding principles of refugee protection within the landscape of international law 
and politics has, however, produced two exigencies. Firstly, the establishment of one 
universal refugee concept carries with it implications for the idea of state sovereignty and 
the principle of territorial supremacy vis-à-vis the international community. Secondly, the 
notion that the refugee concept, as set forth in the Convention, is universal and all 
encompassing in scope poses challenges in terms of the room left for interpretation of the 
refugee definition. The remainder of this chapter will explore these exigencies and their 
components. Drawing on feminist critique of how the “neutral” and “universal” 
Convention language in reality was used to favor the male perspective and experience, I 
argue that the room left for interpretation within the refugee law created leeway for states 
in deciding which refugees to accept and which to exclude, as certain assumptions and 
notions in the language could remain unaddressed. This argument highlights the 
relationship between language and power, ultimately asserting that the two exigencies of 
interpretation and state power are not in fact separate, but rather intertwined dilemmas.  
  
1.B.1. The Space Between Citizenship and Humanity: The Refugee Concept       
 and State Sovereignty 
As the 1951 Convention was established within the context of the newly founded United 
Nations, it involved balancing principles of state autonomy on the one side, and inter-
state cooperation and obligations towards the international community on the other. This 
project necessitated the identification of key concepts such as “state sovereignty,” 
“independence,” and “non-interference within the reserved domain of domestic 
jurisdiction” (Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website). Understanding the 
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significance conferred to these concepts helps illuminate certain aspects of the 
Convention itself. As the acknowledgment of universal human rights within the domain 
of international law was still in its initial phases, the Convention was primarily 
understood as an agreement between states regarding the treatment of refugees 
(Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website); it was created “first and 
foremost in the interests of national and international security, not humanity” (Haddad, 
2003:11). This also meant that the Convention was primarily reactive in nature, in that 
“the system [was] triggered by a cross-border movement, so that neither prevention, nor 
the protection of internally displaced persons come within its range” (Goodwin-Gill, the 
UN Office of Legal Affairs website). Refugees were, in this sense, constructed primarily 
as a problem of territorial sovereignty, not of humanitarian principles.  
 
This focus on state relations within the refugee regime highlights the way that two 
distinct movements were happening at the same time within post-war Europe. While the 
atrocities of World War II had led to a growing commitment to universal human rights 
upheld by international law, the norms of state sovereignty and citizenship were 
simultaneously emphasized as key components in establishing and maintaining a stable 
world-order after the war. The paradox of this development is articulated in the following 
claim: “[w]hile the first commitment appeals to a common human identity as the basis for 
multilateral humanitarian action, the second directs our concern toward maintaining a 
world order which insists upon citizenship as the authentic ethico-political identity” 
(Nyers, 1999: 3). 
The notion of individual rights as understood within post-war Europe was anchored in 
belonging to a state, and tied to the ideas of citizenry and national territorial supremacy, 
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because “rights only became real when taken up and protected in the positive law of 
states” (Haddad, 2003: 3). The citizen was, in turn, the state’s raison d’être (Nyers, 1999: 
23), locating the citizen concept at the heart of defining the boundary and identity of the 
nation. The refugee definition within international law, however, promises a legal 
standing through which individuals gain access to rights and benefits vis-à-vis states in 
which he or she is not a member. The refugee concept was therefore situated at the crux 
of this contradictory development, and it “brings to the fore the very tension between the 
state prerogative to exclude and the human rights imperative to include” (Haddad, 2003: 
1). It is in this sense Peter Nyers approaches the “refugee” as a “limit-concept;” in that it 
“occupies the ambiguous divide between the binary citizenry/humanity” (1999: 4). The 
refugee challenges the orderly appearances of the categories of “citizenship” and 
“humanity” because it makes visible the liminal space outside, or beyond, the ontological 
and grammatical place that these two categories delineate. The refugee makes visible “the 
competing commitments to refugees-as-humans and a world order ideally populated by 
citizens” (Nyers, 1999: 4).  
 
In other words, the refugee concept demonstrates limits insofar as it carves out a legal 
space that is characterized by state sovereignty citizenry on one side, but simultaneously 
by humanitarian norms derived from universal and cosmopolitan principles on the other. 
The limit that the refugee concept demarcates is therefore that of “the political,” claims 
Nyers (1999: 4), insofar as it demonstrates that the notion of the “proper political 
subjectivity” begins and ends with the concept of citizenship (20-21). The right to 
political identity and voice vis-à-vis the state, as typically understood, rests in our roles 
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and entitlement as citizens, and “[c]onsequently, refugees […] represent a problem not of 
geographical, but of political space” (Nyers, 1999: 21).  
 
This emphasis on citizenry, statehood, and rights in post-war Europe meant that a certain 
type of refugee became highly visible: the political dissident, fleeing the oppressive 
powers of his own state. For the Convention drafters, refugee movements were initially 
seen as caused by oppressive states, and thus “the refugee” was essentially someone 
deprived of (usually) his political rights (Binder, 2001: 170; Nyers, 1999: 2-3). Thus, a 
dichotomy rose between the “proper” political refugee and those with claims based on 
other (illegitimate) grounds, such as economic deprivation (Foster, 2007: 1). Alice 
Edwards points to a hierarchy of rights within refugee law, which “posits violations of 
absolute civil and political rights as the most acceptable (and most serious) basis for 
asylum, followed by the derogable list of other civil and political rights, thus leaving 
deprivations of economic, social, and cultural rights at the bottom of the hierarchy, with 
only exceptional violations of these later rights justifying an asylum claim” (Edwards, 
2010: 26). This emphasis on the civil and political as somehow more fundamental to the 
human spirit was mirrored in the initial preference given to civil and political rights 
within human rights instruments in general, over those of social and economic character, 
which where originally thought of as “second generation rights” (Charlesworth, 1994: 58).  
 
This dichotomy between the “political refugee” and the “economic migrant” was, 
according to Foster (2007) recast as a gulf between “genuine” and “false” claims to 
asylum. This distinction, in turn, grants states the right to deny refugee protection to 
applicants they deem unfit, for instance those who “in reality” are “just” economic 
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migrants (Foster, 2007: 2-3). Within international law, the prevailing perception was, and 
to large degree still is, that “economic refugees” fall outside the scope of international 
refugee protection (Foster 2007: 2; Barnett, 2002: 250; Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 3), while 
being an issue more relevant, perhaps, to the fields of development and aid (Goodwin-
Gill, 1996: 3). Foster notes, however, that a clear distinction between “economic 
migrants” and “authentic refugees” breaks down in practice: “[i]s a Roma man from the 
Czech Republic, who suffers extensive discrimination in education and employment, an 
‘economic migrant’ or a refugee? What about the street child in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo whose government fails to provide him with the basic tools of survival, such as 
food or shelter?” (Foster, 2006: 4). 
 
The demarcation between “refugees” and “economic migrants” was further solidified as 
the characteristics of the refugee population slowly changed from the 70s onwards, with 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers originating from the developing world (Barnett, 
2002: 247). This marked the beginning of the refugee regime’s change from an East-West 
to a North-South focus (Barnett, 2002: 250). This changing composition of refugees 
further complicated the picture as “the line between refugees and migrants began to blur” 
(Barnett, 2002: 247). In this context, the differentiation between the “worthy” political 
refugees and the “unworthy” economic migrants arguably took on racial undertones, as 
states used this distinction to justify the inclusion of some displaced persons and the 
exclusions of others; or as Barnett observes: “once the North-South flows began, rather 
than recognizing real persecution, receiving nations often labeled such refugees from the 
South as economic migrants, a fact which has earned Western governments harsh 
criticisms of racism” (Barnett, 2002: 254). The construction of a clear demarcation 
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between the economic and the political has, in other words, served as means for 
governments to reduce the number of refugees they are responsible for (Hathaway and 
Neve, 1997), which in reality means that “Western” states were able to reject “needy” 
individuals from the “Global South.” Hathaway and Neve (1997) therefore spoke of what 
they saw as a refugee crisis, due to the fact that “[w]hile governments proclaim a 
willingness to assist refugees as a matter of political discretion or humanitarian goodwill, 
they appear committed to a pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international 
legal responsibility toward involuntary migrants” (115-16).  
 
The denial of economic depravation as a ground for asylum demonstrates that states have 
significant leeway to use their power to decide who is seen as “worthy” of refugee status. 
As Barnett notes: 
even as UNHCR tries to widen the scope of the refugee regime, states narrow it 
again by increasing domestic restrictions. In Western Europe the rate of 
recognition of refugees has decreased significantly; in 1983 these countries 
recognized 42 per cent of applicants but by 1996 the number had fallen to 16 per 
cent (Barnett, 2002: 253). 
States, then, have the power to regulate the size and composition of the refugee 
population it receives, to a certain degree, despite the “universal” commitments and goals 
outlined by the international community.  
1.B.2. Reading law: Power and interpretation  
The ways in which the political and the economic refugee are made into the genuine and 
the bogus asylum seeker alerts us to the real power that is embedded within the reading 
and interpretation of refugee law. The point that nation-states maintain a certain 
autonomy through employing restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition, leads to 
the second exigency borne from the introduction of the 1951 Convention; namely that of 
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the ambiguity of the refugee definition itself and the terms under which refugee status 
might be granted. The problem of the confusion between economic and political grounds 
for asylum can be seen an issue of interpretation, in this case of the concept of 
“persecution” and whether it covers economic deprivation. Despite being a key concept 
to the Convention, there is no exact definition of what constitutes “persecution,” neither 
in the Convention itself, nor in any of the other international instruments of refugee 
protection (Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 66). The same is true for the five enumerated grounds 
for persecution, and there has been much debate on the true meaning of concepts such as 
“particular social group,” or “political opinion.” This leaves, as demonstrated above, 
room for governments and institutions involved in determining refugee status to interpret 
how the refugee definition should be applied in each case (Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 67). 
Interpretive differences, therefore, have potentially massive impacts “on the ground,” as 
definitions of key terms may work to exclude different groups from the scope of the law. 
In the example of the racialized exclusion of economic refugees, for instance, it has been 
noted that the problem does not arise from the refugee law itself, but rather from the 
interpretation of that law (Barnett, 2002: 254). 
 
The types of persons and experiences are seen to fall under the scope of the refugee 
Convention, then, depends on the ways that one reads the refugee definition and its 
components. It is in this sense that the problem of forced migration and asylum within the 
international domain can be understood as politics of perception (Barnett, 2002: 255): 
with a refugee concept that allows for various interpretations, those understandings that 
are seen as authoritative enable the perception and visibility of some refugees, while 
others are rendered invisible. As the refugee term was initially read and interpreted within 
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the post-war European context, the norms and perceptions of that era and continent 
shaped the ways in which both the dilemma of forced displacement and the language of 
the 1951 Convention was interpreted. An individualistic conception of persecution 
(Goodwin-Gill, 1995: 8), and the privileging of the political asylum (Binder, 2001: 170), 
informed a certain understanding of what it meant to be a refugee, which worked to 
delegitimize experiences that did not conform to this idea. Anjana Bahl argues that the 
interpretation of the refugee definition “operates against the claims of refugees from the 
Third World who may not be fleeing their countries because they are deprived of their 
individual rights, but rather are fleeing social violence or general policies that affect large 
sections of their society” (1997: 36, footnote 23). Refugee movements caused for 
instance by “economic disasters” or the “break down of state machinery” (Edwards, 
2010: 30) may similarly fall outside interpretations of the Convention definition.  
 
While the Convention used a language of “universality” and “objectivity,” the geo-
political context it was constructed within meant that it was the European perceptions of 
the “neutral” and the “normal” that prevailed and that subsequently was being read into 
such categories. There was therefore a tension between the language and ambition of 
universality, and the way that this language was in fact interpreted and applied so that a 
“Western” point of view was furthered, in turn influenced by specific economic and 
ideological assumptions (Barnett, 2002: 249). The problem arises, in other words, 
because the ambiguity of the refugee definition allows certain presumptions and 
prejudices to go unaddressed. The international regime of human rights, and the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular, assumed a certain “Universal Man,” 
(Palmary, 2008: 129) without realizing that this subject was being interpreted and 
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understood within a “Western” framework.  
 
This “Universal Man” of human rights in general, and refugee law in particular, was not 
only essentially a European figure – he was also an inherently male figure. At its 
adoption in 1951, not a single woman was present at the Geneva conference where the 
refugee Convention was drafted (Edwards, 2010: 23), and ultimately, neither the 
Convention nor the Protocol incorporates sex or gender either as grounds for persecution, 
or as prohibited bases of discrimination.3 The question of gender-related persecution 
came up only once, and it was decided that asylum claims arising from persecution on 
account of sex was unlikely to occur (Edwards, 2010: 22-23). Although the majority of 
the refugees were (Chan, 2011: 177) and still are female, women typically lack the 
financial means, resources, and freedom to leave their country of origin, and the 
international community was therefore, at the time the Convention was adopted, faced 
with a population of asylum-seekers who were predominately male (Chan, 2011: 177). In 
addition, the majority of adjudicators responsible for interpreting the law and deciding on 
refugee status were, then as now, male (Bosi, 2004: 795). These circumstances 
contributed to the fact that within all aspects of the refugee regime, it was the male 
perspective that became the norm: “from the process of defining a refugee to the final 
phase of resettlement, both the overall discourse, practice, and research concerning 
refugees […] remains primarily a male paradigm, even if in a superficial way it appears 
to be a universal and general one” (Indra, 1987: 2). 
                                                
3 For instance, article 3 of the 1951 Convention, on Non-Discrimination, reads that: “The Contracting 
States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion 
or country of origin.” 
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The refugee was from the beginning imagined and envisioned as male (Indra, 1987: 3), 
more specifically, as “someone heroically seeking to assert his (typically male) 
individuality against an oppressive state” (Nyers, 1999: 25); or as a “male dissident 
fleeing political persecution behind the iron curtain” (Olivius, 2010: 3). The power of 
such cultural images are, as Indra notes, significant because “public images constitute one 
of the most profound constraints on social action, for through the power to form societal 
images and symbols comes the power to set the stage for formal responses to social 
issues” (Indra, 1987: 3). The same way that the ambiguity of the Convention language 
allowed interpretations of the term “persecution” that excluded the experiences of 
displacement in the “Global South,” the interpretive exclusion of economic and social 
claims also contributes to the disadvantage of women. The devaluation of social and 
economic forms of harm “play[s] into a gendered refugee discourse, by disadvantaging 
women claimants who are more likely to be adversely affected by poverty and social and 
cultural marginalization than by direct political targeting” (Edwards, 2010: 26). This 
means that forms of harm specific to women, such as female genital cutting (FGC), rape, 
or domestic abuse may be understood as falling outside the definition of “persecution” 
(Fletcher, 2006: 112-113). Women also frequently fail the “nexus test,” or the 
requirement to establish a connection between the enumerated Convention grounds and 
the motive for persecution  – the link that corresponds to the “for reasons of” part of the 
definition, so to speak – as it is understood within gender-biased interpretations of the 
refugee definition. Because women’s persecutors more frequently involve non-state 
actors, the link between the persecution and the Convention ground is increasingly 
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difficult to establish, as there rarely any exists documentation of the perpetrator’s motive 
in such cases (Fletcher, 2006: 113).  
An androcentric reading of the refugee law therefore worked to exclude women in a 
number of ways. Applications of the law frequently ignored that men and women might 
experience each of the five nexuses – race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion – differently. A narrow understanding of the 
term “political opinion,” for instance, might only recognize as “political” those acts and 
domains that are predominately male, and perceived as “public.” At the same time, 
interpretations of the other aspects of the refugee definition, such as the “persecution” 
term and the nexus requirement, meant that women-specific forms of harm were seen as 
falling outside the scope of the refugee protection regime. The consequence has been that 
women’s claims to refugee status have long been delegitimized (Edwards, 2010: 23), and 
forms of persecution specific to women, such as sexual violence, are only now being 
recognized as such (Neacsu, 2003: 193). It is therefore, ironically, the very gender-
neutral formulations and ambition of the refugee Convention that rendered women 
invisible. This leads one scholar to hypothesize whether, at the time the Convention was 
drafted, “a choice of a gender-sensitive formula instead of gender-neutral terms may have 
prevented the unsettled and unpredictable case law that has followed” (Binder, 2001: 7-8).  
 
With the growing importance of feminist thought throughout the 60s and 70s, and 
impelled by the United Nations World Conferences on Women in 1975, 1980 and 1985 
(Olivius, 2010: 3), the Convention text was increasingly read through a gender sensitive 
lens. In their critique of the presumed legal subject of refugee law as male, scholars and 
activists also began to question the heteronormativity with which the refugee subject was 
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constructed. During the 80s and 90s, key receiving nations, such as Germany and the 
U.S., began to accept that homosexuals might form a “particular social group,” whereas 
the U.K. acknowledged this stance as late as in 1999 (Millibank, 2003: 71-72). Within 
this development, it became increasingly apparent how the refugee categories were 
frequently interpreted in ways that excluded the experiences of homosexuals and 
bisexuals. One example is the category of “political opinion,” where homosexuals, much 
in the same way as women, struggle to have their experiences recognized as such. 
Millibank (2003) writes that despite most of the applicants not necessarily being 
“politically active around sexuality issues,” it is the way that their sexuality is perceived 
as a threat to “the state, the family, or the natural order” that often put them at risk (106). 
“Sexuality [is], in that sense, a political experience, but this is not the sense in which 
political opinion is traditionally understood in refugee law. It is remarkable that sexuality 
claims are rarely articulated, and almost never received, as political claims” (106-107). 
Also when it comes to the “particular social group” nexus, homosexuals, and in particular 
bisexuals, face barriers in terms of the ways sexuality is linked to questions of choice. 
Judiciaries are found to frequently lean on essentialist conceptions of sexual identity as 
immutable and innate (Rehaag, 2008: 61), instead of fluid and complex, and are thus only 
willing to accept the claims of those who appear unable to “choose” their sexual 
orientation. Thus, writes Millibank, “[r]efugee protection routinely attaches to sexuality 
only where it is or where is it perceived as a result of necessity and not choice” (2003: 
92.) She explains: 
You are protected because you cannot help being gay, and cannot help being 
persecuted for being gay because you cannot help expressing your gayness 
somehow. In situations where the applicant was seen as having some choice, or 
their sexuality in any way fluid or temporary – if they could be seen as bisexual, 
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young, sexually inexperienced generally, or having had only limited same-sex 
sexual experiences, the Australian tribunal, in particular, was very reluctant to 
accept them as actually gay and therefore eligible under the social group category 
(Millibank, 2003: 92-93, footnotes omitted).  
 
Assumptions about what lesbians or gay men, and their lifestyles, look like may lead 
adjudicators to dismiss the stories of individuals who do not conform to this stereotype 
(Rehaag, 2008: 71-72; Millibank, 2002: 177). This shows that heterosexuality is very 
much taken as the norm; the standard against which other forms of sexuality is measured 
and judged. Individual presumptions on the part of decision-makers about what it means 
to be “gay” affects the ways he or she interprets and applies the refugee category: “[t]he 
decision-makers’ understanding of what (homo)sexuality is and how it is and ought to be 
expressed is therefore vital in the decision making process,” writes Millibank (2002: 145). 
     
1.C. Concluding Remarks 
What this introductory chapter has demonstrated is that the establishment of the universal 
definition of the “refugee” carried with it two exigencies, one related to the power of 
states in vis-à-vis the international community, and one to the power of language and 
interpretation. In short, the first exigency stems from the tension arising from the 
existence of international refugee law, between universal and international principles on 
the one side, and domestic state authority on the other. While nation-states are bound by 
international principles and laws, they are nonetheless able to exercise power through the 
ways in which these laws and principles are transferred to, and applied within, the 
domestic context. The second exigency concerns the ambiguity of the language with 
which the refugee definition is formulated. This ambiguity enables certain assumptions 
and prejudices to be presented as “neutral” within authoritative interpretations of the law, 
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and therefore remain unaddressed. More specifically, because the refugee definition was 
originally drafted and interpreted with the popular image of the male, European, 
heterosexual refugee fleeing political persecution in mind, other experiences of 
persecution and harm were rendered invisible and outside the scope of the Convention.  
 
What the feminist critique of the refugee law has demonstrated, then, is that these two 
exigencies are not, in fact, different problems that can be separated and analyzed on their 
own, but rather two intertwined issues. Because of the ways that power may be exercised 
through the act of interpreting text, nation-states retain much authority vis-à-vis the 
international community in deciding how the refugee definition should be understood, 
and thus, which individuals qualify for the refugee standing that entitles them to 
protection. The insight offered by feminist readings of the law is therefore that a 
significant part of the challenges female asylum seekers face are in fact located in the 
fields of language and interpretation, because the refugee law tends to be read both 
within a male-centered framework, and by men. Because it historically was, and 
continues to be, women who have their specific experiences excluded from authoritative 
readings of the refugee definition, it remains an important practice to analyze the ways 
that the refugee definition is interpreted and understood, and how the categories of 
“gender” or “women” are understood within these interpretations.  
 
The ways in which states and decision-makers may apply understandings of key concepts 
and terms within universal laws – which in turn allows them to regulate which 
individuals are included as “legitimate” refugees and which are excluded from this legal 
standing – represents a very real and important problem for scholars of international 
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relations. Despite increasing sensitivity to gender issues, interpretations of the refugee 
definition continue to differ between and within states, and Courts keep making 
irreconcilable decisions in asylum claims. A 2004 study of 41 European states show, for 
instance, that  
less than half had recognized sexual violence as a form of persecution (41.5 per 
cent); over a third of countries (33 per cent) do not accept persecution at the hands 
of non-state actors as falling within the definition of a refugee in the 1951 
Convention; and nearly two-thirds of countries do not acknowledge failure to 
conform to social and cultural mores as a basis for a claim to asylum (61 per cent). 
Moreover, just over one-third of countries had recognized women or particular 
women as members of [particular social groups] PSG (36.5 per cent). Likewise, 
jurisprudence in the United States has been at best muddled (Edwards, 2010: 30). 
 
What is at stake here is in a sense the very nature and ambition of human rights and 
international law, which seeks to extend to all individuals the same rights and protection. 
The problem of the refugee concept points to certain issues at the very heart of 
international law in general, which has the contradictory task to draft universal standards 
and formulations, while simultaneously remaining relevant and inclusive of all 
individuals - across cultures, classes, genders and so forth. Edwards describes “the value 
of international human rights law as a common language reflecting universal values, and 
as a shared legal system that articulates basic standards of a life with dignity,” (2011: xii). 
Yet the feminist critique asserted by her and others highlight the fundamental importance 
of analyzing and questioning this “common language” of universal values, and the 
concepts and definitions that may be taken for granted within it.  
 
In the next chapter, I investigate this broader scholarly conversation about gender within 
the international refugee regime, and the ways that gender is constructed and presented as 
a category within it. I address not only the feminist critique of the Convention, but also 
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the differing approaches between feminist scholars as to how gender can and should be 
reconciled within refugee law. Thus, I try to show the multifaceted and diverse nature of 
the feminist conversation. I also seek to make the point that there is no simple process of  
“discovering” and subsequently including women within the refugee definition. What this 
inclusion should look like and how it should happen continue to be contested questions, 
and Courts continue to treat gender-related issues in irreconcilable ways. From this 
overview of feminist engagement with the “problem” of gender within refugee law, I then 
situate my own question about the relationship between gender and the refugee definition 
as it is constructed, and set up a research plan for the analysis to come. 
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
Accounting for Gender: 
Feminist Engagement with Refugee Law 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined the exigencies brought forth by the introduction of a 
universal definition of refugee status, to illuminate the power embedded in interpretation 
and representation within international law. Using feminist critique of the refugee 
Convention, I argued that the silencing of women’s points of view could be reframed as a 
question of language and interpretation; or the terms with which one is able represents 
oneself to the law. The literature review further examines the complexities of this 
problem by exploring the controversy presented in and through scholarly literature. I 
primarily focus the literature review on feminist engagements with international law, 
paying particular attention to how feminist scholars address refugee law. Specifically, I 
investigate how feminist approaches construct and theorize gender as a category of law 
and policy. Within this focus, the literature outlined in this chapter centers on questions 
of inclusion and exclusion of gender within international law and policy, and on the 
question of how the legal category “women” is, and should be, “read.” 
 
I organize this chapter around three separate, but related, questions. Firstly, I start more 
broadly by looking at literature on how, to borrow Olivius’ words, “gender inequality has 
been constructed and reconstructed as a policy problem within the UNHCR” (2010: 2), as 
well as within international institutions, policies and programs generally. The question 
central to this debate is “whether women's rights are best protected through general 
norms or through specific norms applicable only to women,” a dilemma Olympe de 
Gouges identified as early as the eighteenth century as a paradox of feminism 
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(Charlesworth, 2005: 1). This section looks closer at strategies of including women 
within both feminist debate and UNHCR policy, from the initial addition of women’s 
concerns within separate programs, policies, and institutions, to the diffusion of a gender 
focus through “gender mainstreaming.” The second question around which I organize this 
literature review is how gender is discursively constructed and represented as a category 
within the language and ideologies of the international refugee regime. I look closer at 
how the idea of a gendered binary between “private” and “public” spheres and acts has 
worked to exclude women’s experiences of harm from the protection of the refugee 
Convention. I address the representation of masculinity and femininity within refugee law 
and policy, and how these concepts intersect with those of race, and sexual orientation. 
Lastly, the literature review turns to the more specific conversation about the language of 
the refugee Convention, and the issue of how the refugee definition should or can be 
amended in order to rectify the gender deficiency. I organize this section around the 
question of whether women’s experiences are best included through gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the existing definition, or by modifying the language of the Convention 
by adding “gender” as a sixth enumerated ground for persecution. I look closer at the 
rationale and arguments presented by proponents of each of these positions.  
 
The literature reviewed in this thesis is significant, I argue, because it invites a study of 
texts that address the relationship between refugee status and gender. In the final section 
of this chapter, then, I define and justify the question that will be the centerpiece of this 
thesis. Based on this overview of the feminist engagement with gender within refugee 
law, I contextualize the rationale for the study to be carried out, and introduce the text 
that makes up the material for the main analysis, the 2002 UNHCR “Gender-Related 
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Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” situating this text within the larger 
conversation it is a part of.  
 
2.A. Including Women: From “Sidestreaming” to “Mainstreaming” of Gender 
The reading of international law through a gender-lens has revealed much about how 
gender is constructed and represented within seemingly “neutral” policy. As Olivius 
(2010) points out, “[d]efining political problems is never a neutral activity; how a 
problem is constructed determines the boundaries of different social categories; which 
categories are cast as vulnerable, needy, or in positions of privilege. Different problem 
constructions constitute different relations of power” (4). Investigating how the 
international community constructs the problem of forced displacement, and thus shapes 
what policy and legal responses that are seen as appropriate, will therefore reveal how 
gender is constructed as a category and subject of knowledge. Edwards (2011) 
demonstrates that the feminist critique of international human rights law can be divided 
into four major themes or categories (Edwards, 2011). Her organization of scholarship on 
gender and human rights into a few main categories, or themes, helps structure the 
literature overview in the following section, and demonstrates both the similarities and 
differences between the various approaches within the literature. The first category of 
critique focuses on the absence of women and women’s voices throughout the human 
rights field; the second addresses the ways in which the male experience is privileged and 
constructed as the norm, whereas the realities of women’s lives are discounted and 
marginalized; the third directs attention to the dichotomy between private and public 
spheres, in which the private/female is seen as subordinate to the public/male; and the last 
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set of criticism focuses on the ways in which women have been treated and 
conceptualized as a homogenous group “with a single gender identity” (Edwards, 2011: 
37). These different nodes around which feminist criticism centers are parallel to the 
ways feminist approaches has developed over time, from a focus on women as a specific 
group with special needs, through gender mainstreaming and later modifications such as 
“age, gender and diversity mainstreaming” (Edwards, 2010: 22).  
 
The initial critique of international law and policy from a gender perspective focus on the 
absence of women’s points of view from such documents and programs. In the early 70s, 
Esther Boserup and other feminist scholars changed the conversation about development 
programs by arguing that these projects were biased towards men. Boserup’s main 
criticism was that women were excluded and neglected within development projects, 
which on the outset appeared “gender neutral,” but in reality focused on providing aid 
and modernization to men (Boserup, 2001: 40). Development practitioners and 
researchers argued that major institutions, such as the UN, were male-biased, “resulting 
in women being ignored and/or disadvantaged by the development process” (Koczberski, 
1998: 396). This criticism sparked much debate on the relevance of gender within the 
field of development and its institutions, a question central to what is now known as the 
Women in Development (WID) model. WID scholars and practitioners seek to ensure 
that also “Third World” women receive what is seen as the benefits of modernization. 
The WID strategy thus focuses on “integrating” women into the scope of the 
development process, while increasing their participation within formal economic and 
political structures (Koczberski, 1998: 399). Within the WID framework, then, 
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“integration” mean, in the words of Koczberski, that “women would be incorporated into 
existing development practice under orthodox notions of development” (1998: 396). 
  
Spurred on by this focus on women within development and aid, the UN Decade for 
women (1975-1985), and the UN World Conferences on Women, feminist scholars and 
activists extended the criticism to the field of refugee protection (Olivius, 2010: 3). A 
transnational movement for the rights of refugee women grew throughout the 80s, 
(Olivius, 2010: 3), calling for the equal inclusion of women within the scope of refugee 
protection. Gender had been “discovered” within the refugee regime – and subsequently 
constructed as a subject of knowledge – which gave rise to questions about how women 
and men might experience flight and exile differently, and how gender should be taken 
into account to improve refugee protection. Such inquiries lead to the creation of new 
field manuals, training programs, and policy documents such as the 1989 UNHCR Policy 
on Refugee Women (Olivius, 2010: 3), in which women’s concerns were added to the 
(otherwise unchanged) refugee programs. In 1985, the Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR’s Programme (EXCOM) – the governing body of the UNHCR – established that 
“women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having 
transgressed the social mores of the society” fell within the interpretation of the refugee 
definition, although it was left up to the sovereign nation-states to choose whether or not 
to do so (Edwards, 2010: 24).  
 
The initial feminist critique of the refugee protection regime, in other words, constructs 
gender inequality as a problem that is ameliorated through adding specific women’s 
programs and policies to existing structures – a so-called “add-women-and-stir” approach 
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(Olivius, 2010: 7). Seeking to “integrate women into the development process of 
becoming more western and more modern,” however, “WID never challenged the 
dominant modernization paradigm, or the idea of essential femininity and masculinity” 
(Olivius, 2010: 7). That is, early feminist criticism focused on the exclusion of women 
from development structures, without challenging the ways that the structures themselves 
were biased (Charlesworth, 2005: 2). Women were treated as a separate group in need of 
“particular accommodation,” and initial policy responses were criticized for resulting in 
the “compartmentalization” (Charlesworth, 1994: 63), or “ghettoization,” of the concerns 
of women, relegating them to peripheral “sidestream” projects (Edwards, 2010: 307-308). 
Since the overarching framework was left unchallenged, the male experience and point of 
view continued to be the norm, while women’s concerns were represented as the 
exception to, or deviation from, this male standard. A further concern is that the 
compartmentalization of women’s concerns into separate institutions means that they 
must compete with the mainstream programs and policies for finances and resources. 
This has resulted in women-specific programs generally enjoying less power, priority, 
and resources than the mainstream ones (Charlesworth, 2005: 1).  
 
The “adding on” approach to the relationship between gender and the refugee status was 
challenged by scholars claiming that gender should be viewed as “an organizing principle, 
not a simple variable,” within migration and refugee movements (Fitzpatrick, 1997: 24), 
and that “the protection of women and girls is ‘a core activity’ and ‘an organizational 
priority’” (Edwards, 2010: 32). Doreen Indra (1987) pointed to the tendency of decision-
makers involved in refugee determination to view people as “refugees first and women or 
men second” (4) – which relegates gender-identities and gender-concerns to secondary 
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status – and pointed out the necessity in placing gender “at the centre of the analysis” (4). 
Out of such criticism grew a different approach termed “gender mainstreaming.” This 
strategy seeks not to separate, but to integrate, women’s concerns “within every corner of 
the humanitarian and human rights system” (Edwards, 2010: 35). Acknowledging that 
seemingly gender-neutral policies may affect women and men differently, this approach 
seeks to assess “the implications for women and men of any planned action, including 
legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels” (UN General Assembly, 
1997: 27). Although many women-specific policies were continued, the UNHCR 
incorporated strategies of gender mainstreaming, developing what was called their “two-
pronged approach” of combining specific programs aimed at refugee women with a focus 
on integrating their concerns into the “mainstream” projects (Edwards, 2010: 35). 
“Gender”, for instance, replaced “refugee women” as focal points within UNHCR 
policies (Edwards, 2010: 37). Aiming to establishing an inclusive refugee regime, the 
gender mainstreaming strategy after a while developed into an “age, gender and diversity 
mainstreaming” (AGDM) approach, as new social groups were added as focal points 
(Edwards, 2010: 38).  
 
The gender mainstreaming strategy has, however, been criticized for achieving the 
opposite of its intentions. Edwards argues that “the […] consequence of working within 
the mainstream is the reality that being held to the same standards as men de jure results 
in women’s subjection to additional (and therefore unequal) legal burdens de facto. 
Female litigants must ‘fit’ their experiences of violence into male-defined criteria” (2011: 
106). Another point has been that the strategy loses its “critical edge” by “allow[ing] the 
mainstream to tame and deradicalize claims to equality,” and by making issues of gender 
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inequality “harder to identify and to deal with” – in effect “drowning out” the project of 
gender equality (Charlesworth, 2005: 2). When a focus on the exclusion of women is 
merely “blended” with concerns for all refugees generally, the emphasis on inequality 
and power imbalances between men and women may be lost. Edwards further adds that 
the strategy is problematic in its conflation of the two concepts “sex” and “gender,” and 
in its failure to address the roots of sexual inequality (2010: 36). In the words of Edwards, 
gender mainstreaming has in some ways “become a neutralising [sic] philosophy, rather 
than an empowering one for refugee women” (Edwards, 2010: 37), and she asks: 
“[w]hose interests will be prioritized, if all interests are equal? Will such a strategy be 
meaningful if it includes everyone in equal measure, almost regardless of disadvantage, 
patriarchy, or hierarchy?” (Edwards, 2010: 39). 
 
A final approach to how gender should be understood and incorporated within policy, 
which in some ways overlaps with the insight of the AGDM strategy (Edwards, 2010: 39), 
is intersectionality theory. Although more broadly applicable as a general theory of 
gender and identity, the approach of intersectionality is of particular interests in terms of 
how gender should be thought of within policy. The intersectionality approach focuses on 
the “multiple forms of discrimination which affect women’s lives” (Edwards, 2010: 39), 
an approach in which gender is not seen as the only organizing (hierarchical) principle 
within the lives of women (or men, for that matter). Yuval-Davis explains how 
intersectionality theory focuses on the inter-relationships between various “social 
divisions,” (2006: 194) such as gender, class, sexual orientation, race, and physical 
ability. Intersectionality refers to how such categories constitute axes of identity that 
intersect and combine in creating unique experiences and identities. This insight is a 
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criticism of reductionist and essentialist conceptualization of various categories as being 
inherently tied to certain traits and characteristics. Whereas the initial WID response was 
additive in that it sought to “add” the experiences of the singular group “women” to 
existing institutions and programs, intersectionality is constitutive; social divisions are 
not simply added to one another in constituting identities (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 195), but 
rather combined to make unique experiences. Social categories are seen as changeable 
and dynamic, and they cannot be separated and analyzed “outside” of each other. 
International theorists argue, then, that policy and institutions should incorporate more 
nuanced understanding of gender, and depart from seeing “women” as a pre-existing 
entity or group of inherently oppressed individuals.  
 
2.B. (Re)presenting Gender: Producing Femininities and Masculinities  
As this brief overview of feminist engagement with refugee policies, laws, and programs 
has demonstrated, “gender” is far from a natural, given concept that can easily be 
incorporated into policy and law. Ideas of gender both underpin, and are produced within, 
the policies and practices of the UNHCR and other refugee institutions (Olivius, 2010: 5). 
This following section, therefore, looks closer at various attempts to understand and 
represent “gender” within the field of international refugee protection. One such gendered 
assumption is the idea of the (gendered and Western) dichotomy between “public” and 
“private” spheres (Millibank, 2002: 157). Criticism of the constructed public/private 
binary – in and through which women’s activities are relegated to the undervalued private 
sphere, and men’s to the privileged public – is at the heart of much feminist criticism.  
As this section demonstrates, this inherently gendered notion of the private and the public 
affects the reading of all aspects of the refugee definition; from what harms are codified 
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as “persecution” and the locations where such harms are thought to take place, to the 
understanding of what constitutes a “political opinion” as a ground for persecution, and 
who the agents of persecution are.  
 
Interpretations of the refugee Convention have, to begin with, typically privileged 
“persecution occurring within the (usually male dominated) ‘public’ sphere,” while “de-
emphasising” or “disregarding the legitimacy of persecution arising from activities which 
are considered somehow ‘private’” (Nyers, 1999: 7). Interpretations of the term 
“persecution,” have in other words granted this status to the acts and forms of harm that 
are seen as taking place in specific (public) places, and involving specific actors and 
motives: “the accepted understanding under international law of ‘persecution’ remained 
mostly confined to instances of torture and inhuman treatment carried out against 
political dissidents by public authorities in state custody, and not to victims of rape that 
took place in their homes” (Edwards, 2011: x). An individual who experiences 
persecution based on his political opinion is thus seen as deserving of refugee status and 
protection, whereas someone who experiences systematic domestic abuse is thought of 
outside international refugee law. At the conference where the 1951 Convention was 
drafted, it was for instance, altogether decided that “the equality of the sexes was a matter 
for national legislation” (Edwards, 2010: 23). States have thus had much leeway within 
the refugee language to disregard the disadvantages usually suffered by women, 
dismissing them as “private matters” outside the scope of international law (Bahl, 1997: 
35). Persecution in the forms of rape, domestic abuse, female genital cutting, and 
trafficking are amongst forms of persecutions that are only recently beginning to be 
recognized as such (Neacsu, 2003: 193).  
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This conceptualization of private versus public is also significant in terms of interpreting 
the enumerated grounds for persecution, in particular “political opinion.” This term has 
generally been understood within refugee law as “opinions contrary to or critical of the 
policies of the government or ruling party” (Edwards, 2003: 68), a definition that reflects 
a certain taken-for-granted association between the “political” and those acts and spheres 
that involves the state machinery. Or put another way, the silence of women within the 
refugee regime is partly “compounded by an unconscious calculus that assigns the critical 
quality "political" to many public activities but few private ones” (Indra, 1987: 3). The 
labeling of women’s experiences as “private” and “non-political” both denies them any 
systematic or societal meanings and importance, and sends the message that gendered 
violence is “[women’s] problem, that they are to blame for it, and that they are alone in 
resolving it” (Edwards, 2011: 318). The inherently gendered interpretations of the 
refugee experience, as coded in a language of “private” or “public,” make it difficult for 
decision-makers to recognize women as deserving of refugee protection. As Edwards 
asks: 
Why is it so difficult to recognize the acts of a woman in transgressing social 
customs as political?  (…) Why are young girls who refuse to undergo female 
genital mutilation not political dissidents, breaking one of the fundamental 
customs of their society? (2003: 68 – footnotes omitted) 
 
The ways in which the “public” and the “private” are coded as gendered becomes 
particularly apparent in asylum claims based on sexual orientation, where Millibank finds 
“stark gender differences in the experiences of lesbians and gay men and the subsequent 
translation of these experiences into legal categories” (2002: 157). While the violence 
lesbians face is generally codified as happening in the “private” spheres, such as within 
the home and the family, violence against homosexual men is thought of as happening in 
  
33 
the “public,” for instance in parks or areas around gay bars and clubs (Rehaag, 2008: 73). 
This assigning of the labels “public” and “private” to the harms experienced by gay men 
and lesbians respectively, constructs different barriers for men and women who seek 
asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation. While male claimants are often rejected 
because their sexuality is seen as “too public,” i.e. that they knowingly “flaunt” their 
sexuality and thereby transgress social mores, lesbian claimants are frequently rejected 
because the violence against them is seen as a private matter, “too private” to fall within 
the scope of international law (Rehaag, 2008: 73; Millibank, 2002: 157).  
 
The privileging of the public lastly becomes evident in the way the refugee convention 
conceptualizes the agents of persecution. Within human rights law in general, the focus is 
on state responsibility (Edwards, 2011: 37), while the refugee definition was constructed 
with state persecution in mind. When direct state involvement becomes prerequisite for 
recognizing an act as persecution, the outcome is gendered. While women are frequently 
victims of state-sanctioned abuse and persecution at the hands of state officials, (Schenk, 
1994: 304), women are also the predominant targets of certain forms of harm that are 
labeled “intimate” or “private,” such as such as for instance domestic abuse, FGC, forced 
marriage, or “honor” killings. In such instances, their persecutor may not be a state 
official, but rather family or community members (Schenk, 1994: 306). Because certain 
forms of harm are codified as “private” or “personal,” and somehow disconnected from 
public life and the society at large, they have long been excluded from the refugee 
definition. Gendered assumptions about “public” and “private” spheres, and the “proper” 
arenas for the feminine and the masculine, have in other words had great implications for 
asylum-seekers “on the ground.”  This illustrates that taken-for-granted notions of 
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categories and stereotypes shape the reading of law, and in turn, become reproduced 
through it. It is therefore important to investigate closer how notions of femininity and 
masculinity, and the associated power relations, become (re)produced within the 
institutions, practices and language of global governance (Olivius, 2010: 4).  
 
In order to address these topics, the works of Michel Foucault on discourses and power 
make a helpful backdrop. For Foucault, discourse can be seen as the structured ways in 
which we think and talk about things (1972: 76). Within discourse, we use and construct 
categories and labels attached to certain groups, such as for instance “women,” 
“homosexuals,” or “refugees,” and Foucault was interested in how power operates 
through the way we represent, categorize, and in general speak about such groups. A key 
point here is that discourses does not merely use or identify such categories, they also 
“form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). In the words of Olivius, 
“discourses are practises [sic] which delimit what can be said, thought or done; when, 
how and by whom. Discourses set the limits for what is perceived as possible, reasonable 
or natural” (2010: 5).  
 
The works of Foucault became highly influential during the 70s and 80s, and with the 
new insight and perspectives, feminist criticism took up the question of how women were 
represented within the international refugee regime. The argument, generally stated, was 
that the policy discourse contributed to a victimization of refugee women, by 
constructing the female refugee as weak and vulnerable through “protective discourses,” 
which “often depicted women collectively as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of protection” 
(Edwards, 2010: 32).  In analyzing the representation of refugees within the UNHCR, 
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Johnson (2011) argues that the collective imagination of the refugee has gone through 
three overlapping and concurrent shifts: from racialization, through victimization, and 
feminization (1016). In other words, the “heroic, political individual” fleeing the 
oppressive state as the central visualization during the cold war era was gradually 
replaced by the image of a “nameless flood of poverty-stricken women and children” 
(1016). In this process, and as the refugee concept becomes racialized and feminized, the 
refugee is also deprived of the (political) agency that was at the center of the post-war 
refugee concept. It is significant, as Johnson points out, that “as the refugee has been 
racialised and victimised, she has also been feminised” [sic] (Johnson, 2011: 1016). 
Interestingly, Fitzpatrick (1997) notes that “adjudicators are more receptive to arguments 
premised on the physical vulnerability of women (for example, to the risk of female 
genital mutilation) than to the enhanced dangers women face as a result of prescribed 
social roles or gender-based constraints on mobility” (44). This might show that 
stereotypical notions of what it means to be a woman shapes legal practice, and how 
policy approaches are built on different understandings of gender as a category.  
One way the essentialist and protective discourse on women as refugees has played out, 
is through the “womenandchildren” approach, in which the phrase “women and children” 
is used so often that the distinction between the two collapses (Johnson, 2011: 1032). 
This in turn infantilizes a woman by implying that she, like a child, is in need of 
protection. It thus serves to portray women as passive subjects who need to be saved, 
inherently “dependent upon their male counterparts for survival and salvation” (Johnson, 
2011: 1032). It furthermore reaffirms men as the normal, while women are depicted 
primarily in and through their roles as mothers or family members (Johnson, 2011: 1032). 
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As late as 2002, notes Edwards, the UNHCR included the goal to “[meet] the protection 
needs of refugee women and refugee children” in its Agenda for Protection (Edwards, 
2010: 32). “This conflation of ‘women and children’ in UN documentation as late as 
2002” notes Edwards, “harks back to earlier days in which women and children were 
consistently treated as one and the same” (2010: 32). 
 
Criticism, however, was also directed towards how “women” has been constructed as a 
category of analysis within feminist works. Mohanty (1984) argues that within Western 
scholarship on development and aid, the discourse of empowerment is both gendered and 
racialized. She argues that “Third World Women,” in particular, are constituted as a 
singular, homogenous group, bound together by their shared status as oppressed and 
disadvantaged (1984: 56). They are labeled “powerless,” “exploited,” and “sexually 
harassed,” paralleling sexist discourse that frames women as weak and emotional (56). In 
writing on the emergence of the WID framework, Koczberski similarly argues that 
“Third World women have been presented in a particular way, with their problems and 
needs identified by WID ‘experts’, and their control over the development process firmly 
restricted” (Koczberski, 1998: 395). This reveals two underlying ideas of scholarship on 
development: both the idea of the “developed” West that uses technology to save the 
“backwards” South; and the parallel narrative of the weak woman in need of saving, 
oppressed by her “savage” culture. “By constructing such essentialized categories of 
analysis, holds Mohanty, both Western scholarship, and the literature of the WID 
framework, (re)estabslish binaries, such as between men and women, black and white, 
modern and traditional. Mohanty thus illustrates why a study of representation within the 
development discourse is crucial. While WID scholars and practitioners talk about the 
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empowerment of “women” generally, a closer reading of the policies and strategies of 
this framework reveals that such ambitions mean something different altogether for 
“Western women” than for the women of the “Global South.” Drawing on the insights of 
Mohanty, Ingrid Palmary’s study of the place of culture within refugee law finds within 
UNHCR policy documents “an ambivalent treatment of culture as both protective of 
women as well as the source of women’s oppression in societies that are loosely 
identified as ‘traditional’” (2008: 125). She finds that the categories of tradition, culture, 
and gender are conflated, and that culture is treated in the “static and uncontested way 
now so thoroughly critiqued” by Mohanty and other feminist researchers (2008: 125). 
When categories of culture, race and gender is utilized in this way, the “source of 
women’s oppression is located in her culture and her men rather than in a global system 
of inequality perpetuated through universal humanisms” (Palmary, 2008: 132). This 
illustrates the ways in which discourse shapes how a problem is understood, and in turn, 
which policy options are seen as effective and appropriate responses. 
 As this section has established, the feminist engagement with international law and the 
refugee concept draws our attention to the ways in which gender is constructed and 
understood as a (legal) category, and how meaning is created through our interpretation 
of language and definitions. When looking at feminist engagement with international law 
generally, and refugee law specifically, however, it is important to remember that 
feminist critique is not one unison voice. Rather, feminist engagement is multifaceted and 
dynamic – where they might “agree on the goal of equality, they disagree about its 
meaning and how to achieve it” (Edwards, 2011: 37). This is also true within the feminist 
engagement with refugee law. While the overarching goal is generally the same – to 
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analyze and/or amend the historic exclusion of women’s point of view within refugee law 
– there is significant disagreement in terms of how this is best achieved. Within the 
literature on this topic, at least two main diverging approaches emerge. On the one side, 
scholars and activists argue that the refugee definition, as it appears in the Convention, 
can and should be interpreted in new and creative ways in order to ensure proper gender 
sensitivity in the ways we understand the conditions of an asylum claim. On the other 
hand, scholars also hold that women’s point of view can (only) be sufficiently 
incorporated through modification of the language and definition itself, mainly in the 
form of adding gender as an additional sixth enumerated ground for persecution. In the 
next section of the literature review, I look closer at this specific part of the discussion on 
gender and the refugee law, which concerns the Convention definition in particular, and 
how it can become gender-inclusive.            
2.C. Textual Addition or Interpretive Inclusion?  
Considering that second article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of “sex” or “gender,” scholars and 
practitioners have questioned why gender is not added to the refugee Convention as a 
sixth enumerated ground of persecution. One argument used in supporting a textual 
addition of gender is that the male bias built into the law can only be redressed by the 
addition of a gender nexus, because only this will “send a definitive message to asylum 
adjudicators that they must treat gender-based persecution as they do other forms of 
persecution” (Bosi, 2004: 812). In other words, this argument holds that despite the 
existence of guidelines providing legal interpretive guidance, inconsistencies continue to 
occur, with unfavorable outcomes for women (Chan, 2011: 172; Bosi, 2004: 812). 
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Scholars furthermore argue that the lack of such a category subjects women claimants to 
a higher burden of proof (Chan, 2011: 185), as their gender-related claims must be 
brought and formulated “through” one of the other five grounds – even in cases where the 
claimants were abused “solely on the basis of their gender” (Bosi: 804). In the U.S. 
context, Chan (2011) and Bosi (2004) argue that despite the existence of guidelines, 
decision makers frequently struggle to find a consistent way to reconcile or incorporate 
gender-based claims within one of the other five enumerated categories (Chan, 2011: 
173; Bosi, 2004: 795). In this regards, Bosi notes that the majority of adjudicators 
evaluating asylum applications are male, in a society which continues to privilege the 
male “public” sphere over the female “private” one (2004: 795).  
Drawing on feminist critique of the “adding on” approach to women’s concerns, Schenk 
(1994) argues that the creation of a separate gender nexus, as opposed to a language of 
“women’s rights,” avoids “treating gender as difference,” and thus avoids an essentialist 
approach to gender identity (339). With the aim to improve “protection for women 
without acknowledging the existence of gender differences” (339), an additional gender 
nexus would be preferable, according to Schenk, as it does not “require any radical 
reconstruction of the definition of ‘persecution’ or ‘human rights’ in light of women’s 
unique experiences. It simply asks for the even and consistent application of the law with 
respect to all types of persecution, including gender persecution” (1994: 339).  
Chan (2011) further asserts that the addition of a free-standing, although restricted, 
gender nexus within U.S. refugee law will affect the framework, or vocabulary, available 
for women in formulating their claims to asylum based on gender-related persecution. As 
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“the forced classification of gender-based claims into one of three categories [religion, 
particular social group, or political opinion] frequently misrepresents the critical gender 
component of many claims,” (Chan, 2011: 186) the addition of a gender nexus would 
serve to highlight the gendered aspects of the claim, while providing a more accurate 
language with which to express gendered experiences. Adding a gender category would, 
then, be a “way of acknowledging the legitimacy of certain gender-based asylum claims” 
(Chan, 2011: 177). Similarly, Bosi contends that “[g]ender persecution should not veil 
itself behind the classification of a ‘social group.’ Rather gender should and can be a 
category in its own right” (2004: 798, footnotes omitted). 
Within the existing jurisprudence, the “particular social group” (PSG) nexus is the 
ground most frequently invoked to frame asylum claims in which gender is the ground of 
persecution  (Edwards, 2010: 28; Neacsu, 2003: 194). Proponents of adding a gender 
nexus therefore argue that the conditions that this category provides for women claimants 
should be taken into consideration. The argument is that the absence of any clear 
academic or legal definition of what constitutes a PSG makes it a “theoretically and 
empirically vexing category” (Bosi, 2004: 791), whose definition is “ambiguous, narrow, 
and contrived” (Chan, 2011: 180). Bosi furthermore argues that the strategy of evoking a 
PSG in order to frame gender-related claims has “created an often mechanistic and 
reductive classification problem by creating artificial sub-categories that are arbitrarily  
either denied or granted asylum” (2004: 792). This unpredictability, in turn, leaves 
intolerable room to for adjudicators to apply interpretations that excludes women’s 
experiences, and the arbitrariness of Courts in accepting various gender-related groups as 
PSGs makes this strategy an unpredictable one. Schenk further argues that the PSG 
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definition is problematic in that it runs the risk of either excluding gender-related groups 
through a too narrow definition on the one hand, or “subsuming the entire framework of 
asylum law” on the other, rendering the remaining grounds superfluous (Schenk, 1994: 
336). Similarly, Edwards finds that “[i]n many jurisdictions, PSG has now become the 
default ground for women’s claims, even when one or more of the other grounds may be 
equally or more applicable” (2010: 28). 
Contrary to this approach, other scholars and practitioners hold that gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the already existing definition will be a preferable way to include 
women’s point of view. Rodger Haines states, for instance, that 
[n]either the refugee definition nor the 1951 Convention in general refers to sex or 
gender. This omission is, however, without significance. The ordinary meaning of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention in its context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Convention requires the conclusion that the Convention 
protects both women and men and that it must therefore be given a gender-
inclusive and gender-sensitive interpretation (2003: 323-4).  
This argument holds that there is room within the existing legal structures to incorporate 
gender-based claims (Greatbatch, 1989; Bahl 1997). Argumentation frequently refer to 
the object and purpose of the Convention to provide protection based on universal 
standards, and that gender is therefore integral parts of the refugee inquiry: “[s]ince men, 
women, and children can be persecuted in different ways and since Article 1A(2) 
demands an inquiry into the specific characteristics and circumstances of the individual 
claimant, the sex and/or age of the refugee claimant are integral elements of the refugee 
inquiry” (Haines, 2003: 325). Greatbatch also argues that greater gender-sensitivity can 
in fact be achieved within the existing structure of the Convention:  
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[a] human rights based approach to defining persecution, the recognition of 
women as a particular social group, documentation of discriminatory and 
repressive measures aimed at or particularly affecting women, access to full and 
fair determination procedures, and a liberal reading of the Convention definition, 
would provide the basis for the development of a profile of gender-based refugee 
claims, and for recognition of the difference gender makes” (1989: 526).  
Similarly, Anjana Bahl holds that a an interpretation of persecution that recognizes 
violence against women in addition to an understanding that women can constitute a 
PSG, are necessary in order to include women claimants, establishing that “[t]he present 
legislation, both in the United States and internationally, can accommodate these claims 
within the existing infrastructure” (1997:73). Greatbatch furthermore holds that “simply” 
adding on gender as a separate nexus will not amend the interpretive challenges involved 
in determining refugee status (Greatbacth, 1989: 518). This strategy, she argues, 
“assumes consensus on the nature of gender-based persecution”  (Greatbatch, 1989: 518). 
In other words, an additional gender category, and related concepts such as “gender-
based persecution,” will also require interpretive practice, and does therefore not avoid 
the potential ambiguity and inconsistency that results from interpretation.  
Haines lastly argues that not only is there “no realistic prospects” of an addition of a sixth 
category to the Convention; such an expansion of the definition may even have a negative 
impact for women claimants: “the argument in favour of a sixth ground may have the 
unintended effect of further marginalizing women if misinterpreted as an implicit 
concession that sex and gender have no place in refugee law at the present” (2003: 326-7). 
This echoes the intentions of gender mainstreaming as a method, that gender should be 
understood as an all-encompassing concept, present within all aspect of policy and law, 
and not addressed separately. The approach of gender-sensitive interpretation seems to 
place a greater emphasis on the intentions of the Convention in extending protection 
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indiscriminately, and that insight in these intentions should guide its reading and 
interpretation. This locates the problem not as an issue of the formulation of the law itself, 
but rather of it being read from a partial perspective (Haines, 2003: 327). 
2.D. Concluding Remarks: Outlining the Question and the Research Plan 
Drawing on the Foucauldian idea that policy problems are discoursively constructed, the 
feminist critique has demonstrated the ways that international policy and law is shaped by 
assumptions about gender and the categories of “women” and “men.” Whereas the WID 
scholars assume that women’s concerns can be added to the existing structures without 
questioning the ways such structures themselves are inherently gendered, the proponents 
of gender mainstreaming rather hold that a gender-focus should be diffused throughout 
international institutions. The differences between such feminist strategies demonstrate 
that distinctive notions of gender always underpin such approaches, and shapes how the 
problem of gender inequality is understood and what policy responses are seen as 
appropriate. But the insight brought by feminist scholars is not only that notions of 
gender shapes policy and law in these ways; it is also that policy and law in turn manage 
and construct different understandings of “men” and “women.” From gendered and 
racialized depictions of the male, white refugee, as an individual who heroically flees 
state oppression, imagery has shifted towards unnamed masses of “women-and-children” 
from the Global South, inherently constructed and seen as victims. These ways of 
(re)presenting “the refugee” not only draw on prejudices of the male and the female, and 
of blacks and whites, but also perpetuate and construct such stereotypes.  
 
Because the issue of gender inequality within the refugee law is so complex, there is no 
simple solution, no quick fix, by which the refugee definition can become gender-
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inclusive. Scholars and practitioners disagree on whether gendered experiences of 
persecution should be incorporated into the scope of refugee law through adding gender 
as a sixth protected ground within the Convention, or by employing gender-sensitive 
interpretations of the already existing definition. It is noteworthy, however, that both 
these stances seem to point to language and interpretation as part of the issue. Proponents 
of a freestanding gender nexus argue that without gender as a separate category, women 
are forced to classify and formulate their claims as based on “political opinions,” or 
“particular social groups” and so on, which in turn downplays or misrepresents the 
gender component of their claims. Proponents of conducting gender-sensitive 
interpretation, on their part, argue that adding gender as a category will not bypass 
interpretive challenges, because the term “gender” (and other terms associated with it), 
must also be interpreted. Bridging these two “sides” is the common presumption that 
what creates barriers for women claimants is the very way (legal) language is read and 
interpreted. What this point demonstrates, I argue, is that in the debate on textual 
amendment versus interpretive inclusion, one loses sight of the greater question of how 
gender itself is discursively constructed as a category within legal language, and how this 
category is subsequently read and made intelligible to the law. Whether added as a nexus 
to the Convention definition, or employed as a guide on how to interpret the existing 
definition, “gender” is a term that will itself be subject to differing legal understandings 
and readings. I therefore argue that there is a need within this debate to address how the 
category of “gender” is itself read and made intelligible to the law. The issue of gender 
within refugee law is ultimately a question of what it means to be recognized by law, to 
be able to speak to the law and have one’s claims heard. This problem necessitates an 
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investigation of the terms in and through which victims of gender-related persecution 
may appear before the law and seek rights. This thesis addresses this need.  
 
In order to take up such a project, I will turn in the next chapters to the UNHCR 
publication “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within 
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees” (in the following referred to as the Guidelines). This text enters 
the debate on how to achieve a refugee law that is gender inclusive, as it seeks to provide 
guidance to decision-makers on how to conduct a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 
refugee definition. In terms of the need identified above – to identify how gender as a 
category might be read within law – it is important to look at how the Guidelines itself 
construct the category of “gender.” This endeavor will contribute to inquiries into how 
gender is constituted vis-à-vis the refugee concept. It is interesting to look at the 
UNHCR’s stance on how a person’s gender may interrelate with their refugee status, as 
this may tell us something more general about how gender is seen and constructed as a 
form of identity. Thus, I will in this thesis do a close reading of the UNHCR 2002 
Guidelines in order to answer the following question:  
 
How does the UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution define the relationship 
between refugee status and gender? 
 
Based on this close reading of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, I argue that the 
relationship between gender and the refugee status is one in which gender becomes a 
ground, or base, for the refugee status. Gender is treated as stable, confined, and easily 
recognized as separate to other identity markers, such as race or nationality. Based on this 
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argument, I assert that the Guidelines ultimately entails a performative contradiction. In 
attempting to make gender intelligible to the law by constructing it as a coherent ground, 
the Guidelines struggle to pin down the words with which gender-claims may be 
expressed within law, as their meaning becomes conflated and confused throughout the 
document. That is, the Guidelines ultimately cannot establish gender as a ground in this 
way, as the word with which to express gender slips. In attempting to define gender as a 
ground, the Guidelines do not account for the ways that gender identity is not 
experienced, nor articulated, in the same way for all individuals.  
 
I develop my analysis in three parts. Firstly, I address how the Guidelines constructs the 
problem of gender within refugee law and sets up the best-fitted solution. Here, I argue 
that the issue is defined as a lack of recognition of women’s claims, in that it is the biased 
reading of the law that has produced gender-disparity within the refugee regime. 
Promotion more gender-sensitive interpretations of the Convention thus becomes the 
most appropriate solution. Secondly, as my question concerns how gender is discursively 
constructed, I look closer at the vocabulary, terms, and concepts the Guidelines offers in 
describing and constructing gender. I find that the Guidelines clearly defines and 
distinguishes key concepts in describing gender as an identity – such as “sex” “gender,” 
“sexuality,” “women,” and “men” – but that the definition of such terms break down in 
practice, as they are conflated and used interchangeably throughout the document. The 
third inquiry concerns how the Guidelines establishes the relationships between the 
gender category and the various elements of the refugee definition. I argue that the 
Guidelines treats gender as an enclosed and confined entity, separate from the other 
definition elements, such as notably race, and nationality. The Guidelines does not 
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address gender identity as it may intersect with the other convention grounds to make up 
unique experiences that may be expressed within law. The next chapter outlines the 
components and techniques of close reading as a method, and explores how this 
methodology is suitable in reading for the ways gender is discursively constructed within 
the Guidelines. 
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Chapter Three - Method 
The Methodology of Close Reading: Language and Power 
 
My research question concerns how the UNHCR Gender Guidelines defines the 
relationship between the refugee status and gender. To investigate such a relationship, it 
is necessary to employ a methodology that will allow me to address how language 
constructs meaning. This chapter explores the way such a study may be carried out. 
There are many ways to approach topics relating to gender and the refugee status. My 
question, however, is specifically concerned with the ways in which texts themselves 
illuminate how international organizations create the possibilities and limits for 
establishing refugee status. Thus, this thesis is concerned with the discursive construction 
of the gender category within the Guidelines, and how this category might be read. To 
better understand the relationship between gender and refugee status, then, I turn to the 
methodology of close reading to analyze how language constructs meaning. I argue that 
close reading is best suited to investigate the question at hand, because of the 
attentiveness of close reading to the ways text is socially situated, and how power may be 
embedded in language. 
As a method, close reading is more that just a set of techniques, it is also built on several 
theoretical insights about how language is socially situated. Close reading presumes that 
words and concepts are never neutral or given, but that their meaning is always context-
bound and socially constructed. This, in turn, means that close attention should be paid 
not only to what is said in the text “at the outset” in terms of the claims and statements 
asserted in the text, but also how these claims are argued and structurally constituted 
  
49 
within the text, and the meanings conveyed by each of these elements. In other words, a 
close textual reading allows us to understand how meaning is created through the relation 
between what is said and how it is said. An understanding of these theoretical aspects of 
close reading, particularly in terms of the social function of language, is crucial in order 
to grasp both how the method works, but also why this form of analysis is important 
within the field of social sciences. In the following section, I will therefore look closer at 
what a close reading is, before I articulate the more specific tools and techniques of 
analysis that this method offers.  
 
3.A. Theoretical Background: The Social Function of Language 
Close reading is defined, in Barry Brummett’s book Techniques of Close Reading, as “the 
mindful, disciplined reading of an object with a view to deeper understanding of its 
meanings” (2010: 3). This phrase gives several pointers as to what separates a close 
reading from simply reading a text, the first an academic exercise, and the last something 
most of us do on a daily basis. Close reading is disciplined in that it is an attentive, 
rigorous, and purposeful reading, often guided by techniques and theories, which in turn 
enables the reader to go deeper into the text beyond what is on the surface (Brummett, 
2010: 28). The vocabulary of “surface” and “going deeper” indicates the 
conceptualization of linguistic exchange as taking place on several levels at the same 
time, or alternatively, as containing multiple layers. This idea that language and text have 
multiple layers of meaning indicates that this meaning can be created –and located – on 
various “places” in a text, depending on the angle and attention of the reader. The 
methodology of close reading is attentive to the ways meaning exists within the various 
levels and components of a text, at the intersection between what is being said and how 
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this is expressed, and that one word can be understood in different ways depending on the 
“level” on which the reading is done and the context in which one does that reading. 
There is more to discover in a text than what is directly expressed on the surface, and 
meanings may shift as we shift the focus.  
 
The insight that the meaning derived from a text depends on the angle and context of the 
reader is precisely what the feminist critique of the refugee law has demonstrated, as the 
seemingly neutral Convention text engendered biased understandings and interpretations 
of what it means to be a refugee. When the concept “persecution,” for example, is read 
within the context of a society in which the “private” and “public” spheres are coded as 
gendered – and where the individuals doing the reading are predominately male – what 
appears to be a gender-neutral concept may in fact be read in male-biased ways. A close 
reading questions and analyzes such meanings and ideas that might be “read into” a text 
by investigating each single word, concept, and argument and how these textual 
components might purvey certain assumptions. Thus, the close reading is fit to answer 
questions about how rhetoric and language manages meaning, which is a crucial exercise 
when it comes to the field of law.  
 
When doing a close reading, then, the goal is to uncover meaning, which Brummett 
describes as “the thoughts, feelings, and associations that are suggested by words, 
images, objects, actions, and messages” (2010: 6). In the words of Nealon and Giroux, 
“[i]t is this examining or questioning of meaning that is the corner stone of social theory” 
(2003: 23). However, the concept of meaning is a tricky one, as it is neither entirely 
subjective (in which case there would be no point in studying it) nor entirely objective 
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(which would mean we had to reject the idea of different points of view altogether). The 
idea of language as a social activity – as an inherently social, not natural, phenomenon 
(Nealon and Giroux, 2003: 24) – is what turns us towards meaning as situated between 
the subjective and objective, as a socially (and collectively) constructed phenomenon. In 
other words, when we conduct a close reading we are looking for socially shared 
meanings. These are ideas that are reasonable or plausible within a certain context, in the 
sense of a historical, cultural and social framework that makes concepts and language 
meaningful: “[w]ords and events have a history of meanings and usages; like the texts in 
which they are sometimes contained, they only mean something within a specific 
context” (Nealon and Giroux, 2003: 24). Meaning is only conceivable in a socially 
specific framework, which is why “[t]he rhetorician questions the […] faith that ideas 
represented by words can be grasped irrespective of their utterance in particular times and 
places” (Constable, 2005: 16). The premise that meaning is socially situated makes the 
study of text and language not only conceivable, but also crucial in order to uncover the 
ways social relations are forged and perpetuated through text. This notion is the basis for 
asking the question of how gender is represented and constituted within the UNHCR 
Guidelines, and how this relationship, in turn, may be read. The method of close reading 
is well suited to investigate such questions because it allows the reader to go beyond what 
is explicitly stated in the text, to the more subtle nuances and concealed meanings and 
implications. 
 
The emergence of this insight represents what is called the linguistic turn in the social 
sciences (Fairclough, 1989: 3), highlighting language and its social role, and where, 
among others, Michel Foucault have made valuable contributions. In his book 
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Archeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault used the term “discourse” to describe 
systematic ways in which we think and talk about things (76), or “a certain ‘way of 
speaking’ […] invested […] in a system of prohibitions and values” (193). These 
discourses have certain sets of “laws” and values that govern what can be said and how it 
can be said within that particular discursive field; rules that authorize some statements 
and preclude others (Foucault, 1972: 27-28). Discourses draw this sense of authority and 
normativity from systems of knowledge. In the discursive formation (or field) of 
medicine, for instance, certain types of knowledge serve to justify and legitimate the 
statements that can be made and how they can be made, within this particular discourse.  
 
According to Foucault, then, discursive formations are constructed around orderly 
systems knowledge. Through the collection and authorization of certain forms of 
knowledge, discourses are productive; they are: “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (49). Discourses form objects by constructing and utilizing 
essentialized categories of people, such as the “homosexual,” the “woman,” or the 
“refugee” for that matter – categories or labels people are predisposed to take for granted 
and accept as “natural” entities. For example, Nyers (1999) has uncovered “the way in 
which the category of the ‘refugee’ has been invented and naturalized as being a 
‘problem’ for the international system of states” (4). Invoking a vocabulary of “problem, 
crisis, challenge, and control,” in turn, shapes our understanding of the phenomenon in a 
profound way:  
if we think of discourse as Foucault does – that is, as a (violent) practice through 
which the objects and practices that constitute the world are regulated and 
controlled, categorized and evaluated – then we will recognize that like any other 
discourse, a discourse of the ‘emergency’ works to enable some questions while 
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disabling others; it attempts to control which objects, propositions, and forms of 
analysis are ‘normal’ and acceptable, and which are not (Nyers, 1999: 11). 
 
Both the discourse analysis and the rhetoric analysis focus on how people are affected 
and influenced by language, how the words we choose do not merely reflect, but also 
profoundly shape, our understanding of the subject being discussed. The example above 
illustrates that the ways in which we talk about things not merely expresses but also 
structures how we think about and understand them. This insight that language also 
constitutes – that it sets limits and affects the ways in which we understand the world – 
draws our attention to how language is tied to power. Foucault therefore turns our 
attention towards what can be termed the “politics of representation,” in which some have 
the power to represent others and to be represented, while others are silenced.  
 
In these ways, close reading is a valuable exercise as it uncovers how power structures 
may be embedded in texts. One of the ways in which power can operate through 
language, writes Foucault, is therefore by predisposing the readers to take certain 
assumptions for granted; to accept them as “truth,” or as self-evident. “We must question 
those ready-made syntheses, those grouping that we normally accept before any 
examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset” (1972: 22), he 
argues. Such ideas are hard to challenge, precisely because we do not normally critique 
what we take for granted. The close reading differs from the everyday reading in that it 
looks for and pays attention to such power structures contained within a text. The close 
reader looks for silences and omission, asks who is empowered and disempowered, and 
questions that which appears self-evident, and how the text establishes authority.  
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The theoretical insights which underpin the methodology of close reading are that 
ideologies and evaluations are coded in language, which in turn has the power to shape 
our outlook and understanding of the topics discussed. These notions of power and 
language will make up the framework of the analysis conducted in this paper. Although 
the approach taken in this thesis is more inductive in nature (in terms of not applying a 
specific theory), it is still necessary to use certain “habits, tricks, and knacks (…) ‘on the 
ground’ once inside a text” (Brummett, 2010: 29), as pointers to what to look for and 
where to look. I will draw on the works of Doxtader (1995) and Constable (2005) to 
establish more precisely what a close reading looks for in analyzing institutionally 
produced text and legal language, respectively. They both point to the importance of 
looking closer at the arguments offered within institutional and legal texts, and how such 
texts convince the reader of how the problem at hand should be understood and 
responded to. Thus, I argue that the techniques related to ideology and argument will be 
of particular interest for this analysis. The next part of this section will look more 
generally at what it means to do a close reading, how to look for the taken-for granted and 
uncover assumptions, and where to direct the focus. 
 
3.B. Techniques of Close Reading  
 
Brummett points to the fact that ways of thinking tend to be systematic, as in that certain 
values tend to be connected to others (2010: 97). One can say that values and attitudes are 
often part of a broader worldview, a net of ideas and perceptions about how the world is 
and should be. Brummett holds that it is these webs of interlinked convictions and 
commitments that can be called ideology, and offers the following generic definition: 
“Ideology is a systematic network of beliefs, commitments, values, and assumptions that 
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influence how power is maintained, struggled over and resisted” (99). Such worldviews 
will not only shape what the actor says, but also the ways in which he or she asserts the 
claim, and how it is justified or argued. Looking closely at the various forms of definition 
and justifications asserted in a text is therefore a way to access the underlying nets of 
assumptions and beliefs, which may not be expressed directly.  
 
Drawing on the insight of Habermas regarding the relationship between communication 
and democratic participation, Erik Doxtader (1995) establishes the importance of 
analyzing argumentation – particularly as it appears within the context of institutions 
claiming legitimacy and justifying their mission vis-à-vis citizens (189). Through 
argumentation, institutions within specific social contexts may claim to represent (and 
simultaneously define) concepts, such as for instance that of the “public good” (185). 
Real power is embedded in institutional arguments and reasoning, as these discursive acts 
allow institutions to establish the rules and norms framing the public debate on the topic. 
Thus, institutions  “prescrib[e] ‘acceptable’ modes of interaction,” (185) which in turn 
works to “screen out” the claims of interests that do not conform to these norms (185), 
such as for instance criticism of the assumptions the institution assert. Doxtader calls for 
the investigation of such institutional “moments of definitional and justificatory 
argument” (190), as they reveal how certain perspectives are validated and naturalized, 
while others are disabled. Therefore, “the study of institutional argument investigates 
how institutions enter into, structure, and perhaps take over public debate” (190). The 
analysis of institutional arguments, then, provides a view into the tools everyday citizens 
have to make demands of institutions. Furthermore, when it comes to policy, institutions 
use argumentation to define what problems comes under its scope, the significance of 
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such problems, and which solutions are the best available to respond to these issues 
(197). Or to say it in the words of Olivius: 
As feminist policy scholars have convincingly argued, dominant discourses in a 
given issue area will determine how an issue or a ‘policy problem’ is interpreted, 
if it is perceived as problematic at all, and consequently what kind of policy 
response (if any) that will be considered reasonable and legitimate. When 
something is considered to be a problem that should be addressed by policy, it is 
of crucial importance what kind of problem it is constructed to be, for whom, and 
caused by what (Olivius, 2010: 3). 
By defining whether an issue is to be understood as a problem, institutional 
argumentation works to limit the ability of the individual to partake in the formulation of 
social problems and their solutions, and in this way, institutional argumentation is tied to 
authority. A close reading should look critically at the definitions and justifications 
offered in constructing policy problems and solutions, because such definitions ultimately 
have to be interpreted from the texts of institutional arguments themselves.  
 
Marianne Constable builds on this insight by suggesting that the close reader should not 
only pay attention to specific arguments and definitions in the text, but also the manner in 
which they are offered – from the entire structure of the text to the choice of words. In 
short, a close reading should look for “what is revealed in the use of particular language 
in particular texts” (Constable, 2005: 14). In writing about the rhetorical analysis of legal 
texts, Constable describes various aspects and functions of the legal text, and the sentral 
notion of “how law tells the one whom it tells what to do” (2005: 19). This points to 
several questions to ask when doing a close reading, including who the audience is, what 
the message is, and how the audience is compelled to accept this message. Similarly, 
Brummett reminds the close reader to ask what claims or conclusions the text leads it 
audience to accept, and what evidence is offered to support such claims (Brummett, 101-
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103). Constable shows some specific ways legal text may convey “what needs to be 
done,” such as for instance “via example, by cognizing statements of rules, by threats and 
coercion, through revelation, through moral knowledge, through legal reasoning, through 
deliberation or strategy” (2005: 19). When doing a close reading, it can be useful to look 
for such rhetorical techniques, or ways of conveying a message.  
 
In so far as the worldviews or fundamental ideas that makes the basis for an argument or 
a text are often taken for self-evident truth by the authors themselves, certain ideas will 
appear as taken for granted, or just assumed in the text. When reading closely, one should 
be alert to such statements that appear obvious or ‘natural.’ As Foucault reminds us,  
[t]hese pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted 
without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitely, 
of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we 
must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of 
a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justification of which 
must be scrutinized (1972: 25).  
 
 
More specifically, in looking closer at the argumentation offered in a text, attention 
should also focus on what the text asks the reader to assume in order to “make the 
arguments work” (Brummett, 2010), or ideas that are taken for granted within the text 
itself. Drawing on the insight of Doxtader that the definitions and concepts used in 
institutional argumentation may have the power to shape the public opinion (1995: 185), 
it becomes particularly important to look for that which appears “natural,” and how it 
works to empower some points of view, while disempowering others.  
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3.C. Concluding Remarks  
Once “on the ground inside the text” of the UNHCR Guidelines, to borrow Brummett’s 
words, these notions of power and language, and how components of the text convey 
meaning, will guide the analysis. In looking for how the relationship between gender and 
refugee status is constructed, I analyze the definitions and justifications, as well as the 
silences or presumptions in the text, while considering the audiences and the effect of the 
language. Specifically, I will start out more broadly by looking at how the text establishes 
the “problem” of gender within refugee law, and the larger justifications and 
argumentation that frames the approach and solutions chosen in the text, namely that of 
interpretative inclusion. From there, I look closer at the words and language used to 
describe different concept and ideas, particularly the concepts of “gender-related” 
persecution, as well as “gender” and “sex,” and the implications of this for how gender is 
to be understood in the refugee context. I try to unveil the taken-for granted by 
questioning the statements and arguments made in the text, and by showing alternative 
approaches and descriptions that could have been used. Finally, I look for how the 
category of gender is established in relation to the various elements of the refugee 
definition, and how these relations work to construct gender as a discursive category. 
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 Chapter Four – Analysis  
The Discursive Construction of Gender as a Ground  
in the UNHCR Guidelines 
 
The story of feminist engagement with refugee law has not been one of a linear 
development. There has not been a simple transition through neatly separated phases; no 
stable movement from the initial exclusion of gender in general – and women in 
particular – as a concern for refugee law, through the “discovery” of gender and women 
as new subjects of knowledge, culminating in the amendment of the lacuna through the 
final stage of gender inclusion. Rather, the previous chapters have demonstrated that the 
relationship between refugee law and the concept of gender has been one of struggle and 
contestation, as practitioners, scholars and adjudicators grapple with the gender concept, 
and the question of how to reconcile it within a legal framework that speaks in a male 
language. We have also seen that this struggle, and its implications, is of particular 
interest for scholars interested women’s and LGBT rights; not because questions of 
gender are not of concern for heterosexual men, of course, but because it is the male 
heterosexual experience, as stereotypically understood, that forms the foundation from 
which refugee law and its language has sprung. Heterosexual men “escape” the 
challenges involved in expressing their gender and sexuality before the law, because their 
gender and sexuality is already there, in the language of the law, and in the interpretation 
and application of its terms. It is only when individuals who do not conform to this 
constructed norm stand before the law that the problem of gender becomes visible, 
because it becomes apparent that they do not have the language with which to (re)present 
themselves and their experiences. It is within these moments that we see that the law 
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struggles, in a sense, in its confusion between different terms and their application. We 
have also seen that this struggle, then, is, in its deepest sense, a question of language, 
because the trouble appears as individuals are trying to formulate or express their 
identities and experiences before the law, but struggle to find the words. 
The contested history of how gender has been understood within international refugee 
law demonstrates the importance of continued critical engagement with the ways gender 
is understood within human rights instruments and publications. The analysis undertaken 
in this thesis therefore seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion of how gender is 
constructed and articulated within refugee law. In order to do so, I analyze the notion of 
gender as it appears within UNHCR’s guidelines on how to conduct gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the Convention language, titled “Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention 
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” (in the following referred to 
as the Guidelines). I have chosen this publication because it represents a direct response 
to the confusion and unpredictability surrounding gender-related cases, and attempts to 
define the problem and provide redress to the issue. I employ the methodology of close 
reading, and conduct a line for line reading of the UNHCR Guidelines in order to answer 
the question of how the relationship between refugee status and gender is defined.  
I ultimately argue that in its attempt to make gender intelligible to the law, the Guidelines 
constructs the relationship between gender and the refugee status as one in which gender 
is a ground from which action or violence emerges. This, in turn, presupposes gender as a 
stable and fixed category or part of identity. I build this argument in three stages. First, I 
explore how the Guidelines frames the issue of gender within refugee law, arguing that 
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gender inequality within case law is understood as a problem of language, in that 
interpretations of the refugee Convention fails to recognize claims asserted by women. 
Secondly, then, I turn to the language and terms that the Guidelines itself offers the 
reader in speaking of gender, how gender-related terms are defined and used throughout 
the document, and how such terms are properly interpreted and applied according to the 
Guidelines. I argue that even as the Guidelines seeks to provide directives on how to 
interpret language in a gender-sensitive way, this document too struggles to find a 
vocabulary through which one can express gender within refugee law in a comprehensive 
way. Lastly, I look at how the various relationships between gender and the different 
elements of the refugee definition are constructed and defined, specifically how gender is 
though to relate to the persecution concept and each of the five enumerated Convention 
grounds. I argue here that the relationship between gender and the persecution concept is 
problematic within the Guidelines, as the document fails to distinguish between gender-
related and gender-specific persecution – that is, between gender as the cause of 
persecution, and as shaping the form of the violence. I assert that the document ultimately 
offers a definition of gender identity in which gender is treated as a separate and confined 
category, in the sense that it can be analyzed and addressed “outside of” the other 
definition elements, particularly race and nationality. This is because the Guidelines fails 
to acknowledge how gender may stand in a causal relationship to persecution, also when 
it intersects with race and nationality as grounds for persecution. I argue that the 
Guidelines, in other words, lacks a sense of intersectionality, and therefore cannot 
adequately correspond to lived experiences “on the ground”.  
Thus, I assert that there exists a performative contradiction within the Guidelines. That is, 
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the document constructs and treats gender as a fixed and separate ground, but the text 
itself is ultimately unable to pin down the language and terms needed to represent gender 
in this way. The very language and terms the Guidelines employs in defining and 
articulating gender is conflated and confused throughout the text; the seemingly clear 
definitions of, and distinctions between, various gender-related terms the Guidelines 
offers the reader, slip away or break down throughout the text. Therefore, the 
performative contradiction arises from the way the Guidelines constructs gender as a 
fixed and separate ground, while the language used by the text itself betrays and points to 
the ways gender is in fact not stable or fixed, nor enclosed and separate from other 
aspects of identity, and not experienced the same way by everyone. 
4.A. Framing the Issue of Gender Within Refugee Law 
The Guidelines should be read against the backdrop of a still developing academic and 
legal debate that addresses how the refugee category is gendered. Although the exclusion 
of women’s experiences is generally identified as a wrong that should be rectified, there 
are differences in terms of what is seen as the reasons for this exclusion, and the ways 
amendments should be made. This first section of the analysis looks closer at the way the 
Guidelines defines the problem of how gender relates to the refugee status, how they 
arrive at this understanding, and how this formulation of the problematic is used to justify 
their chosen response. I argue that the Guidelines establish gender inequality within 
refugee law as a problem of interpretation and recognition, rather than the refugee 
Convention text, or the human rights system in itself.  
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The very first sentence of the Guidelines states that “’[g]ender-related persecution’ is a 
term that has no legal meaning per se” (article 1). This is an interesting opening of the 
text, because it both establishes the framework for the discussion that is to come as one of 
legal terms and their meanings, while also pointing towards the problem inherent in the 
relationship between gender and refugee law: that law does not have the terms to describe 
gendered persecution. The statement can be read as creating a framework in which the 
approach of gender-sensitive interpretation is favored over that of altering the text of the 
refugee definition. It does so because it implies that even if the concepts of gender and 
gender-based persecution are formally introduced into the language of the law, their 
meaning would still be unclear and subject to interpretation and differing definitions in 
any case. The term “gender-related persecution” has no clear meaning within law, and 
therefore remains a problematic point of departure within law that necessitates guidelines 
on how to understand it. The Guidelines chooses to “specifically focus on the 
interpretation of the refugee definition […] from a gender perspective as well as propose 
some procedural practices” (article 1). It does this in order to “ensure that […] the range 
of gender-related claims are recognized as such” (article 1). Gender inequality within 
refugee law is in other words a question of recognition; of how to recognize gender-
elements within a legal language where such terms have no meaning “per se.”   
 From the introduction of the problem, the Guidelines proceeds to provide the 
background of the issue. The reader is informed that “[h]istorically, the refugee definition 
has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which has meant that 
many claims of women and of homosexuals, have gone unrecognized” (article 5). Again, 
interpretation (and interpretive frameworks) is identified as the source of the issues 
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concerning gender and the refugee definition; it is the historic reading of the law that 
constitutes the problem, rather than other aspects of the law itself. In other words, the 
refugee law cannot speak of gender because the male experience has historically 
constituted its framework.  
The articulation of gender inequality within refugee law as rooted in interpretation works 
to enable certain perspectives, while excluding others. The Guidelines does not, for 
instance, make a point of questioning the identity and position of the interpreter, in 
asserting that the interpreters themselves have typically been male. Alternatively, the 
problem of women’s (lack of) access to refugee protection could be framed by pointing to 
the creation and formulation of the law itself, and the fact that it was drafted only by men. 
Or, one could point out that decision- and lawmakers were, and continue to be, 
predominately male (Edwards, 2011: 302), which might mean that their personal points 
of view and prejudices are just as important in the (continued) exclusion of women, 
regardless of whether the legal definitions are modified or whether guidelines are 
published. This alternative emphasis would establish the problem of gender and the 
refugee definition more as a structural and institutional problem, where people have 
unequal access to positions of power where they can define, construct and interpret the 
legal terms within the institutions of international law. The problem, then, would also be 
an issue of participation, not only recognition, within law. Al Attar, for instance, seeks to 
“conceptualize and structure more representative participatory transnational lawmaking 
processes, the kind that would promote both parity of participation and actor subjectivity, 
and possibly further the cause of global justice” (2013: 95). One example could be to 
recommend gender quotas, or other methods of promoting equal gender representation 
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and -participation, in important decision-making and international institutions. The 
Guidelines does not consider any such approaches, and in defining the problem of the 
relationship between gender and the refugee category as one of legal interpretations and 
recognition, alternative approaches are left outside of the scope of the text. The fact that 
the Guidelines chooses to describe the historic exclusion of women as caused by 
(mis)interpretation and (mis)recognition makes up the framework and discourse of the 
text, and something the reader is asked to assume to make the rest of the argument work.  
Upon establishing the problem in these ways, the Guidelines addresses the question of 
whether to add gender as a sixth enumerated ground for persecution specifically:  
[e]ven though gender is not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is 
widely accepted that it can influence or dictate, the type of persecution or harm 
suffered and the reasons for this treatment. The refugee definition, properly 
interpreted, therefore covers gender-related claims. As such, there is no need to 
add an additional ground to the 1951 Convention definition (article 6). 
The argument seems to be that a freestanding gender category would in fact be 
redundant, assuming that a gender-sensitive interpretation will achieve the same results as 
the addition of a gender category. The Guidelines does not evoke arguments that a gender 
category may have unintended implications, or that it would go against the original 
intentions of the convention, but simply that there is no need for such an amendment. 
This, in turn, reflects how the problem is understood; that sex and gender are already 
inherent in the scope refugee definition, as long as it is “properly” interpreted and 
understood.  
 
 
  
66 
The Guidelines identifies the problem of the relationship between gender and the refugee 
status as one of recognizing gendered claims within the legal framework, whose language 
has been interpreted within a male framework. I have shown that this is only one of 
several possible ways to frame the problem, and furthermore, that this specific approach 
makes the response of gender-sensitive interpretation appear “natural,” or best fitted to 
amend the problem.  
4.B. Language: Articulating Gender within Law 
Upon establishing the nature of the problem, the Guidelines seeks to provide guidance on 
how to navigate gender-related claims to the refugee status. The next section of this 
analysis explores this attempt. I argue that the Guidelines tries to amend the issue by 
constructing gender as a kind of ground – an intelligible space from which the violence 
springs out, and which law can refer back to. In other words, gender itself is a seen as a 
stable and confined place, in and through which one speaks the self to the law. This 
attempt falters, however, as the document struggles to pin down words and terms 
expressing gender in such a way.  
The Guidelines notes that “in order to understand the nature of gender-related persecution, 
it is essential to define and distinguish between the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’” (article 3). 
The text proceeds to make the following distinction:  
Gender refers to the relationship between women and men based on socially or 
culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that 
are assigned to one sex or another, while sex is a biological determination. Gender 
is not static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning 
over time (article 3).  
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The Guidelines operates with a relatively clear separation between the two. On one hand, 
“gender” does not refer to some innate or static quality in people, but is rather given 
meanings that are culturally and socially specific, and therefore subject to change. “Sex,” 
on the other hand, is given a much briefer description, signaling that this term is 
comparatively unproblematic and straightforward; that is, the meaning of sex is expected 
to be somewhat more obvious to the reader. Whereas the Guidelines operates with a 
gender concept that is fluid, socially constructed, and tied to meaning, sex on the other 
hand appears as comparably innate and determined, as the text refers to “biological 
determinations” in its definition. Such understandings and definitions of sex and gender 
may not, however, be accepted by everyone, as it differs from an approach that also the 
meanings of the biological sex may in some ways be socially constructed and subject to 
cultural and social interpretations. Feminists have, for instance, questioned the 
immutability of the category (Edwards, 2010: 37) and its acceptance as natural and 
uncontentious (Charlesworth, 2005: 14).  
When looking closer at how “sex” and “gender” appear throughout the rest of the text, 
the clear-cut separation between the two terms delineated in article 3 seems to slip away. 
While “gender” is used most frequently, the word “sex” also appears several times, but 
the reader is not offered any reason or explanation why one is chosen over the other in 
each specific context. The Guidelines states, for instance, that “[e]ven though gender is 
not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can 
influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this 
treatment” (article 6). In this sentence, it is unclear why “gender,” but not “sex,” is 
specified. Only a few paragraphs later, in comparison, the text states that “[w]hile female 
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and male applicants may be subjected to the same forms of harm, they may also face 
forms of persecution specific to their sex” (article 9). Given the distinction given in 
article 3, it might seem that using “sex” in this specific case may be a deliberate attempt 
to point to how men and women are persecuted differently because of their different 
biology and physique. The Guidelines does, for instance, refer to sexual violence as a 
form of violence specific to, and aimed at women in particular.  
However, such a distinction between violence aimed at the biological sex versus on the 
socially constructed gender, may be overly simplistic. The guidelines construct sexual 
violence as a form of violence aimed at women. In discussing trafficking and forced 
prostitution as forms of persecution, for instance, the Guidelines only discuss “trafficked 
women and minors” (article 18) – not only excluding men as victims of trafficking, but 
arguably using a form of “womenandchildren” approach. In the example of racialized 
violence, the Guidelines assert that men may be targets for “maiming or incarceration,” 
while women may be persecuted through “sexual violence or control of reproduction” 
(article 24). However, the Guidelines does not specify that persecution may take on a 
different character for men or women, not only because their different physique 
facilitates this, but also because certain forms of harm, such as sexual violence, may have 
symbolic meanings in relation to the roles and statuses of the genders. Or put in another 
way, a man may chose to persecute a woman through sexual violence, not only because 
their respective physiques makes such an attack possible, but also because such an act 
may at the same time offend the woman’s status as “pure” or “untouched,” and the 
proscribed roles of the men in her community (a father, brother, or husband, for instance) 
who “failed” to protect her. Thus, the intended victim of the act is not only the woman, 
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but also the men close to her, or even her entire community. It is precisely the absence 
within the Guidelines of any such discussion on how gender identity is complicated, 
multifaceted, and “messy” – that it at the same time encompasses both notions of 
physical or biological markers and their meanings, and the prescription of certain roles, 
statuses and responsibilities – that works to reduce gender to one, stable ground. The 
reader is offered seemingly straightforward definitions, without ensuing discussion of 
how such distinctions might look a lot more complicated “on the ground,” where 
meanings of the biological and the socially and culturally constructed may be interwoven.   
In addition to this problematic distinction between gender as biological and as social, the 
topic of sexual orientation is also invoked within the text in ways that blurs the 
distinction between the concepts of sexuality and gender. Sexual orientation is absent 
from the entire introduction of the Guidelines, where it is gender that is established as the 
document’s main focus, as its goal is to “ensure that a proper consideration is given to 
women claimants” (article 1). The term “homosexuals,” on the other hand, appears as a 
group of concern to the Guidelines in article 5, in the sentence: “[h]istorically, the refugee 
definition has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which has 
meant that many claims of women and of homosexuals, have gone unrecognized” (article 
5). Interestingly, it is not a framework of male and heteronormative experiences that is 
articulated as the cause of this failure to recognize claims based on sexual orientation. 
The exclusion of homosexuals is rather identified as the result of reading through a male 
framework. In effect, to be gay is by definition here, not to be male.  
The terms “sex” and “gender” are furthermore used interchangeably with “women” in 
several places. This, in turn, implies that it is mainly women claimants the Guidelines 
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seeks to aid. The Guidelines does provide some justification for emphasizing women in 
stating that “[g]ender-related claims may be brought by either women or men, although 
due to particular types of persecution, they are more commonly brought by women” 
(article 3). Despite the somewhat unclear reason offered to the reader (“due to particular 
types of persecution”), the notion is presumably that it is mainly women who lack the 
terms with which to present themselves and their experiences of persecution to the law, 
and who have been historically excluded from the reading of it. It is, in other words, 
primarily women who lack a place and a voice with refugee law. However, the silence 
that exists when it comes to men’s experiences of gender-related persecution is 
significant, particularly in light of the fact that the Guidelines does discuss homosexual 
men to some extent, recognizing that “[r]efugee claims based on differing sexual 
orientation contain a gender element” (article 16).  
In terms of conflating “gender” or “sex” with “women,” the Guidelines does at several 
points state that a gender-sensitive focus is important, subsequently using only the 
examples of women only to show why this is so. The case of religion is one example, 
where persecution arising from failure to comply with religious mores is only discussed 
in the case of women. For example the Guidelines explains that: “[i]n certain States, the 
religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to women and men respectively. 
Where a woman does not fulfill her assigned role or refuses to abide by the codes, and is 
punished as a consequence, she may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of religion” (article 25). Similarly, in determining the category of “political 
opinion” it is stated that “[t]he image of a political refugee as someone who is fleeing 
persecution for his or her direct involvement in political activity does not always 
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correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in some societies” (article 33). 
Again, the Guidelines jumps from “his or her” to “women” in one sentence. This is 
significant because both these examples are instances where it would be highly relevant 
to mention men – specifically men who identify as homosexual, or in other ways do not 
conform to stereotypical notions of what it means to be a “man” in some societies – 
because they too may be perceived as breaking religious norms, or they might have a 
hard time framing their stances as political.  
Recent domestic case law furthermore shows that articulating men’s experiences of 
persecution as gendered may be an increasingly successful strategy. In terms of the PSG 
category, “[a]n example […] is the Australian High Court decision in Applicant S. The 
majority held that ‘able-bodied young men’ in Afghanistan who fear forced recruitment 
by the Taliban might constitute a PSG” (Edwards, 2010: 42). Other examples of gender-
based or gender-specific violence against men that may constitute persecution are 
“castration, forced sterilization, military recruitment, human trafficking for prostitution or 
pornography, organ removal, forced labour, or punishment for transgressing social mores 
such as homosexuality” (Edwards, 2010: 41). The absence of any discussion of “men as 
gender” may have the effect of establishing for the reader that gender equals women; that 
for women, their gender identity is a defining, organizing and important aspect of their 
identity which profoundly shapes their experiences and opportunities, whereas the same 
is not thought of men, who are mainly portrayed as political or religious actors, involved 
in racial or nationality based conflict, their gender left aside. For men who do experience 
gender-based persecution, in turn, it might be harder to frame their claims as such. 
Lastly, one could also argue that an nearly exclusive focus on women under the heading 
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“gender-related claims to asylum” assumes that gender concerns have been absent in 
previous readings of the law, when an alternative approach could be that a highly 
politicized notion of gender has always been present. One could, for instance, argue that 
the law always has been read through a gendered lens, except this lens has been male-
biased, making the gender element of men’s concerns “invisible.” The ambition of a 
guide to conduct gender-sensitive interpretation could, therefore, bring within its scope to 
reveal how men’s claims may also be based on their experiences and persecution as male. 
This section has established that the Guidelines itself struggles to find a language with 
which to express gender in relation to persecution. This is seen through the attempt to 
define and separate between gender-related concepts – such as “sex” and “gender,” 
“gender” and “sexuality,” or “gender,” “women,” and “men” – while these distinction 
break down in practice throughout the text. This failure to find an adequate vocabulary 
may reflect the complexities with which we might understand the gender concept, as it 
encompasses physical and social aspects, and interrelates with other categories, such as 
sexual orientation. The Guidelines, however, fails to treat gender as it intersects with 
concepts such as for instance sexuality. Building on this argument, I will in the next 
section analyze the ways gender is further treated as separate and enclosed ground that 
can be analyzed “outside” of the other definition elements, rather than in the intersection 
with them.  
4.C. The Relationship Between Gender and the Refugee Definition 
In the following, I analyze how gender is thought to relate to the other definitional terms, 
that is, the persecution concept and each of the five protected grounds of persecution. I 
argue that the relationship that is portrayed is an additive one, in that gender, as well as 
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the other identity categories relevant to the refugee concept, are seen as enclosed, stable 
grounds, that may be added to one another in judging experiences, but that ultimately are 
analyzed and conceptualized as separate entities. Within the text of the Guidelines there 
is no way to think of one’s identity outside of this additive model, which disregards the 
experiences that arise from the intersection of gender with other identity markers, such as 
for instance race and nationality. Thus, point that gender is not experienced as stable for 
everyone, and that it might not be articulated the same way for different people, is 
disregarded.  
Although the Guidelines establishes that the term “gender-related persecution” has “no 
legal meaning per se” (article 1), the term nonetheless appears both in the title and 
several times throughout the document. The question of how gender relates to, and 
impacts experiences of persecution, is furthermore at the heart of any inquiry into how 
the refugee definition should be understood through a gender lens. Literature on the 
relationship between gender and the refugee status outline at least two different ways that 
gender is thought as a relevant aspect of persecution. Or put differently, the idea that 
someone can be persecuted as a woman may be understood in at least two different ways. 
In short, “[t]he concept of women being persecuted as women is not the same as women 
being persecuted because they are women,” writes Binder (2001: 172). Firstly, gender 
may stand in a causal relation to persecution as the reason or motive for the abuse. A 
person’s gender identity may the basis or cause of the persecution, in that a person is 
persecuted because of her/him belonging to that gender. This is encompassed in the term 
“gender-related persecution” (Binder, 2001: 173), and speaks to the motive of the 
perpetrator. Secondly, the types and forms of persecution may be “gender-specific,” in 
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that the violence directed at women may be of a different nature than the violence 
typically inflicted on men, even in cases where the perpetrators motive for persecution is 
the same. In an ethnic conflict, for instance, the men may be maimed or killed while the 
women are raped, both as acts that attempt to destroy the ethnic identity and prosperity of 
a racial group (Guidelines, article 24). These different ways that gender may be a 
necessary element to understand the persecution are usually captured in the terms gender-
related, or gender-based, persecution and gender-specific persecution respectively.  
The Guidelines, after establishing that gender-related persecution has “no legal meaning,” 
does not set out to define these subtle nuances that detail how we understand persecution 
as gendered. The Guidelines seems to operate with an understanding of “gender-related 
persecution” as a term that encompass both meanings outlined above. In Article 6 (cited 
above), for instance, the Guidelines posits that gender can “influence” or “dictate” both 
“the type of persecution” and “the reasons for this treatment.” This wording seems to 
encompass both of the ways gender may relate to persecution outlined above. The 
language that gender can influence or dictate (also understood as to control or decisively 
affect; to determine) the reason for the persecution, constructs this relationship as one in 
which gender is the base that action springs out from. Throughout the document, there is 
some conflation between the two ways that persecution may be gendered, and it is not 
always clear why the Guidelines refers to one meaning over the other. This may, in turn, 
reflect a certain lack of clarity around the terms used to describe gender, and the realities 
and conditions that they describe. The conflation of the two meanings becomes 
increasingly clear when looking at the relationship of gender to the five enumerated 
persecution grounds. 
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In terms of the nexus requirement, through which gender is tied to the ground of 
persecution, the Guidelines establishes that the fear of gendered persecution must be “for 
reasons of” one of the five grounds. The enumerated grounds do not have to be the sole, 
or even dominant, ground, however, as long as it is a “relevant contributing factor” 
(article 20). This could be interpreted as placing less emphasis on the motives of the 
perpetrator, as establishing the main cause of persecution is less important. This may 
facilitate the recognition of acts committed by non-state actors as persecution, as it is 
harder to establish motive in cases of non-state perpetrators (Fletcher, 2006, 113). Thus, 
in order to qualify for asylum a claimant must satisfy the nexus requirement by showing 
that at least one of the five protected Convention grounds is a relevant contributing factor 
within his or her gender-based claim. In other words, the persecution feared must be “for 
reason of” race, nationality, religion, membership in a particular social group (PSG), or 
political opinion. The relationship between gender and the five enumerated grounds has 
therefore significant bearing on the outcomes of gender-related claims. In the following I 
look closer at the relationship between gender and each of these persecution grounds.  
The categories of race and nationality are discussed to a lesser degree in any of the other 
protected grounds, making them appear less significant to gender-related cases. The 
Guidelines notes that the nature of the persecution arising from these grounds may take 
on gender-specific forms. Within the few lines written about race and gender, this 
relationship is described in the following way: “[p]ersecution for reasons of race may be 
expressed in different ways against men and women” (article 24). In terms of nationality, 
the Guidelines asserts that: “[a]lthough persecution on the grounds of nationality (as with 
race) is not specific to women or men, in many instances the nature of the persecution 
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takes a gender-specific form, most commonly that of sexual violence directed against 
women and girls” (article 27). In other words, the Guidelines mentions how race- and 
nationality-based violence may be gender-specific, but not potentially simultaneously 
gender-related or -based. When it comes to the other nexuses, in comparison, the 
question of how gender may “inform” religious or political identities or constitute a PSG 
is discussed for each ensuing ground respectively, whereas the nature of the categories of 
race and nationality are treated more like separate, confined unities, outside that of 
gender. Race and nationality may, in other words, affect what the violence “looks like,” 
but no attempt is made to question how gender may be relevant in understanding race or 
nationality as causes of persecution. That is, the document does not discuss how race, 
ethnicity and gender may intersect and form unique identities and experiences – which in 
turn may be ascribed with special social and symbolic significance in a given society, and 
become the basis for persecution. To take one example, it has been noted that in the case 
of the Mexico femicides –or the widespread abduction, torture and murder of Mexican 
women along the Mexican border - the victims fit a certain profile: they are 
predominately young, dark-skinned females (Livingston, 2004: 59). However, they are 
apparently not attacked only because they have darker skin, and not only because they are 
female, but because they are women with darker skin, in a society where this is attributed 
particular meaning and status (Livingston, 2004: 59). Violence occurring during an ethnic 
conflict can, furthermore, be both racialized and gendered insofar as both ethnic and male 
superiority is established simultaneously through the use of violence. Notions of 
nationhood (and race) may be inherently intertwined with concepts of masculinity and 
femininity and ideas of male dominance, in such a way that aspects of gender and 
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nationality may be inseparable in deciding on the cause of persecution. It can be argued 
that the categories of race and nationality are left somewhat un-problematized in the 
Guidelines, leaving the impression that they are somehow separable from gender identity. 
Gender may, in the Guidelines, “dictate or influence” persecution in its own right, but is 
not thought to intersect and inter-relate with other identity markers or aspects in 
producing experiences of persecution. 
In terms of religion as a ground for persecution, the guidelines note that different roles 
may be assigned to men and women on religious grounds, and that women who fail to 
fulfill or abide by these roles may experience persecution as a result (article 25, quoted 
above). In other words, questions of how religion may intersect with gender via norms 
about other identity aspects, such as sexuality, are not discussed. How norms of 
masculinity and femininity are deeply intertwined with norms of sexuality and vice versa, 
and how such interconnected notions may lead to the (gendered) persecution of lesbians 
and homosexual men, are concerns that are left out of the Guidelines. The Guidelines 
specifies that it in the case of women, is sufficient that the person is perceived to be 
holding unacceptable religious beliefs, notwithstanding her actual opinions on the matter.  
The Guidelines acknowledges that the boundaries between the grounds of religion and 
political opinion can become blurred: “[w]hile religious tenets require certain kinds of 
behaviour from a woman, contrary behaviour may be perceived as evidence of an 
unacceptable political opinion” (article 6). “This is particularly true,” states the 
Guidelines, “in societies where there is little separation between religious and State 
institutions, laws and doctrines” (article 26). The Guidelines operates with a fairly broad 
understanding of the “political,” in “there is not as such an inherently political or […] 
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non-political activity;” rather, “the context of the case should determine its nature” 
(article 32). The term “political opinion” should furthermore be “understood in the broad 
sense, to incorporate any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, 
government, society, or policy may be engaged” (article 32). Non-conformist behavior 
may also fall under the scope of this ground, in so far as such behavior may be taken as 
evidence of the person holding a political opinion. In other words, it is “the context of the 
case should determine its nature [as political],” and the Guidelines specifies that opinions 
on women’s rights and gender roles may be understood as such (article 32). Such open 
definitions of the political create room for acts previously understood as private to be 
reframed as political, which has important implications for gender-based cases. By 
emphasizing context and not only State but also society in outlining the political, the 
Guidelines opens for gender-based claims to be framed as political.  
However, there is still a certain notion of the “political” as stable, and as inherently 
gendered, at play in the Guidelines. The Guidelines state that “[t]he image of a political 
refugee as someone who is fleeing persecution for his or her direct involvement in 
political activity does not always correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in 
some societies” (article 33). As discussed, it is interesting to note the use of gender-words 
in this sentence. From the more gender-neutral inclusion of both “his or her 
involvement,” the Guidelines turns to “the experiences of women in some societies.” The 
text chooses to state that it is women who fall without a narrow understanding of the 
political, rather than people more generally. The effect of this use of gender-words is 
arguably that the relationship of men to the political is cast as typically more direct, in 
that men are political in the original, “simple” sense of the word, through their “direct 
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involvement in political activity,” while women’s political involvement is more indirect. 
Any consideration of other identity markers that may affect the nature of one’s 
involvement in the political across the groups of men and women – such as class, race, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation, for example – are effectively excluded from the sentence, 
because it specifically asserts that it is “women” who deviate from the traditional 
understanding of the political.  
In further describing what political activity might look like, then, for women, the 
Guidelines focuses on how women “are less likely than their male counterparts to engage 
in high profile political activity and are more often involved in ‘low level’ political 
activities that reflect dominant gender roles,” and “frequently attributed with political 
opinions of their family or male relatives” (article 33). These statements seem to confirm 
the notion that political activity is gendered, and that women relate to the refugee 
standing largely by being mis-interpreted as harboring political opinions, or through 
engaging in “low-level” activities of a more private nature, such as nursing sick rebels. 
This gendered understanding of the political provides an example of how women, and 
women’s activities and opinions, are privatized. There is a silence within the Guidelines 
when it comes to the ways that women who work to change the society they live in, who 
do participate in politics, and who actively state their (religious, feminist, political) 
opinions, may experience gender-specific forms of persecution.  
This omission may solidify notions that women largely relate to the refugee status 
through persecution of social and cultural art, rather than political persecution in its 
“original” sense. It is through their roles as community- or family members that they are 
persecuted, as they are involved in nursing the males “properly” involved in political 
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action; or because they are attributed with the actual political opinions of their male 
family members. Or they are seen as political only insofar as they fail to conform to the 
norms ascribed to their gender. Interestingly, Palmary (2008) describes the existence of 
the notion that “violence against women is a form of violence different to the violence of 
war, and is rather embedded in culture […]” (128). The nature of violence that affects 
women is seen as different from the violence experienced by men, and it is primarily 
because women violate the cultural norms that establish their “proper” place and roles in 
society they are persecuted, not because they are targeted for opinions and behaviors that 
in their “truest” forms are political.   
Lastly, the Guidelines does not discuss the question of whether violence against women 
may in itself be understood as inherently political acts. Structural violence aimed at 
women who do not conform to social norms may be understood as a response to a 
perceived threat to male dominance and power. The fact that violence against women is a 
global phenomenon points to ways that such violence is structured. Within such a 
framework, writes Edwards, acts of violence against women can be understood as 
sending a particular political message: “stay in your place or be afraid” (Edwards, 2011: 
318). In the U.K. context, Querton (2012) notes that “to be recognised as refugees […], 
women must often demonstrate that they fear persecution on account of their membership 
of a particular social group (PSG) because the proposition that any violence against 
women is political has not yet, as such, found enough support” (4).  
As noted by Querton (2012) and others (Edwards, 2010: 28; Neacsu, 2003: 194), PSG is 
of particular significance for gender-based claims. This “make[s] a proper understanding 
of this term of paramount importance” (article 28). The PSG category is furthermore 
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arguably the most ambiguous of the five nexuses, and it is the ground that allows claims 
where gender is the sole basis for persecution. The Guidelines define a PSG as: 
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of 
being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic 
will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise 
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights (article 
29).   
This definition combines two distinct approaches to the PSG category, the “protected 
characteristics” and the “social perception” approach (Chan: 181). The first asks whether 
members of the proposed social group possess some innate, unchangeable or immutable 
characteristic, whereas the social perception approach asks whether the members of the 
group are perceived as a group in society (Chan, 2011: 181). The UNHCR definition 
encompasses both approaches, making the PSG ground broad in scope. 
 
However, the PSG category is limited in that “the interpretation of this ground cannot 
render the other four Convention grounds superfluous” (article 28). In other words, 
categories such as race, nationality, and religion must fall outside of the concept of PSG 
as properly understood. “Sex,” on the other hand “can properly be within the ambit of the 
social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by 
innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than 
men” (Article 30). There is a certain tension between these two decisions. Whether there 
is some innate difference that makes a category based on sex or gender fall within the 
ambit of a particular social group, whereas one based on race or nationality does not, is 
left unaddressed. The Guidelines offers little justification why it reaches this conclusion 
at all, merely stating that “in some cases, the emphasis given to the social group ground 
has meant that other applicable grounds have been over-looked” and that therefore, “the 
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interpretation given to this ground cannot render the other four Convention grounds 
superfluous” (article 28).  
 
Again, it is interesting to note that the word used to describe the PSG here is “sex,” not 
“gender.” This choice might mirror an inherent conflation of the two terms within the 
document. Alternatively, the biological “sex” may consciously be used to invoke the 
physical aspects of gender as opposed to relational roles and identities. When the 
Guidelines jumps from “sex” to “women” in this way, it might be reasonable to think of 
“women” here understood in the more biological sense. The emphasis on biological traits 
might reflect that they are more easily defendable as “innate and immutable” 
characteristics, which the claimant is unable to change. When it comes to gender-related 
claims of persecution based on (resisting) proscribed roles and responsibilities, it might 
be more complicated to establish that the claimant’s refusal to conform is “fundamental 
to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.” This problematic can be 
illustrated by the case of Fatin v. I.N.S. in which an Iranian woman claimed a fear of 
persecution partly based on her political opinions as a feminist. Her case was rejected, in 
part because she failed to establish that her “opinion on women’s rights was not 
sufficiently fundamental to her personal beliefs so as to cause [her] to continue her 
advocacy in Iran,” which in turn would mean that she would not raise herself to the 
attention of Iranian authorities (Chan, 2011: 182). She was for instance asked whether 
she would agree, after all, to wear the veil upon having to return to Iran.  
 
There are, however, certain differences between a PSG based on sex, and the grounds of 
race or nationality as freestanding nexuses. One example of this is that the “name” of the 
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category would not be “gender” but “women.” It is noteworthy that the Guidelines does 
not argue or mention that “men” can constitute a PSG. If case law should frequently 
define “women” as a PSG that may be the ground of persecution, while “men” is not 
treated in the same manner, this may have the effect of victimizing women, treating the 
gender-identity of “women” as a uniform category, identifiable by the members’ inherent 
status as oppressed. Men are not grouped together in this way, but rather diversely 
constructed as political or religious actors, or as persecuted because of their race or 
nationality. Men are, in other words, primarily recognized as persons or individuals, not 
as members of a uniform, subordinate group. Naming the category “women” and not 
“gender” may also reiterate an image that it is men who are the perpetrators (actors), 
while women are the victims (acted-upon). In addition to excluding cases where men may 
in fact be victims of gender-based persecution, this might furthermore have the effect of 
silencing the differences in power and status within the group of “women” in a given 
society. The fact that gender is not the only defining characteristic in women’s lives, but 
rather intersects with a multitude of other identity-markers, such as class or race, is 
downplayed within this construction of women as a stable ground. This ignores the ways 
that women may also be the perpetrators of persecution against other women.  
 
In this section I have looked closer at how the Guidelines constructs the relationships 
between gender and the various elements of the refugee definition. I have argued that this 
relationship is based on additive principles, where each of the categories is seen as 
enclosed unites that the law may address and analyze separately and as clearly distinct 
from each other. Sexuality and gender are treated separately, for instance, and not as 
inherently intertwined concepts. The absence of any discussion of how other aspects of 
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identity, such as race, nationality, sexuality, and class may intersect with gender in 
forming experiences of persecution, leads to the construction of a legal subject that is 
seen as stable, fixed and separate from her culture, history, and community. The group of 
“women” is arguably pitted against that of “men,” disregarding how individuals within 
such group may partake in the persecution of each other, for instance on the basis of 
sexuality or race. The question of how gender may relate to persecution is problematic 
within the Guidelines because the document fails to separate between gender-specific and 
gender-related persecution. Gender may be a ground that persecution emerges from in its 
own right – as such recognized within law as constituting a PSG – but in terms of race 
and nationality, gender can, within the Guidelines, only influence the form of the 
violence. This reflects an additive approach to identity categories, in which the 
Guidelines struggles to articulate the ways that gender may intersect with such categories, 
which, similarly to gender, are constructed as enclosed, and separate grounds. 
 
4.D. Concluding Remarks 
In reading the Guidelines closely to uncover the relationship between gender and the 
refugee concept, I have broken the refugee definition down to its smaller elements, and 
investigated both how gender is constructed in relation to the persecution concept, and 
each of the five enumerated grounds that make up the nexus requirement. I argue that 
gender is treated as a ground that may influence, or dictate, violence, while existing as a 
confined entity, clearly separate from the other elements of the refugee definition. I 
assert, however, that the Guidelines contain a performative contradiction, in that the 
language implemented to describe and define gender is unable to construct gender in this 
way. Rather, the meaning and content of gender-related terms are conflated, altered, and 
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confused throughout the text. Clear definitions of and distinctions between concepts 
break down throughout the publication. Thus, I assert that the struggle within the 
Guidelines to pin down the words with which to express gender betrays the way that 
gender is in fact not stable, confined and easily recognized as separable from other 
identity markers. Rather, feminist insight argues that gender is context-bound and 
flexible, understood and experienced in a myriad of ways. Olivius, for instance, writes 
that “gender is a social construction emerging from particular geographic and historical 
contexts, and as such, fluid and contingent rather than signifying two stable categories of 
subjects” (2010: 4-5). In her work, gender is defined as the “stories that have been told 
about ‘men’ and ‘women’” (Olivius, 5). Judith Butler, on her part, argues that there is not 
one essential female identity that can be represented, whether within law or elsewhere. 
She holds that gender identity is performative; it is posited through our actions, rather 
than something we begin with as an essential ground for identity. Or in her words: “what 
we take to be an internal essense of gender is manufactured trough a sustained set of acts, 
posited through the gendered stylization of the body” (1999: xv). This thesis argues that 
the Guidelines offers a definition of gender identity that lacks and understanding of 
gender as intersectional with other aspects of identity, and as inherently bound up in a 
multitude of meanings, contexts, and symbolisms. 
 
These points made in the analysis section have relevance for what it means for an 
individual to be “read” by the law; how one makes a claim that are recognizable within 
legal contexts. As the analysis and literature review has illustrated, the question of 
appearing before the law can be recast as a question of language, and the terms with 
which we may “speak” ourselves to the law, and how, in turn, those terms are interpreted.  
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As we have seen, this is furthermore a particularly problematic process for women, 
because they have to assert their claims within a male-biased interpretive framework, 
which lacks the words to express gender-related experiences. The Guidelines too 
struggles to pin down terms that describes gender in relation to law and the refugee 
status. In the following chapter, then, I turn to this question of what interpretations of 
gender as a category means for how women are read by the law “on the ground.” In the 
concluding discussion, I therefore investigate trends within case law in order to better 
understand the implications of the arguments asserted in the analysis. I argue that the 
interpretive nature of (refugee) law both posits barriers form women claimants, in 
producing case law that is unpredictable and irregular, while also creating opportunities 
for claimants and advocates to discursively challenge and develop notions of gender 
within law. Drawing on the notion of human rights as narrative constructions, I argue that 
an investigation of the discourse of human rights institutions is of crucial importance in 
order to promote equality within human rights law.   
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Chapter Five - Conclusion 
Gendered Claims to Asylum: Issues and Possibilities 
 
In doing a close reading of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, I have argued that the 
publication contains a performative contradiction. On one hand I assert that gender is 
treated as an enclosed and separate category that exists outside of other aspects of 
identity, particularly in the case of race and nationality. As such, the Guidelines lacks a 
sense of intersectionality in its treatment of gender, as gender is not analyzed at the places 
where it intersects with other aspects of identity, such as sexuality, race, or nationality. 
This leads to the construction of a human rights subject whose identity is fixed and stable. 
The contradiction contained in the Guidelines arises from the way that the language the 
document itself uses to describe gender betrays the way that gender is a complex and 
interrelated part of identity, bound up in socially and culturally specific meanings. That 
is, while the Guidelines treats gender as stable, fixed, and enclosed, the text is unable to 
pin down a language, or a vocabulary, that expresses gender in such a way. Rather, the 
way that words and their meanings are conflated throughout the text reveals how gender 
is a complex concept, encompassing a variety of lived experiences and culturally and 
temporally specific meanings.  
 
The argument formulated in the previous chapter points, however, to a question of what 
this performative contradiction within the Guidelines means for asylum seekers in 
particular – and of the significance of language for those studying human rights in 
general. Thus, the discussion conducted in this concluding chapter is devoted to a 
question about the relationship between language on the one hand, and the field of human 
rights, and the various lived experiences of people “on the ground,” on the other. In the 
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following, I look closer at what it means to make a claim to the refugee status in terms of 
gender – how people may articulate their claims in order to make their gendered 
experiences and identities intelligible to law – in light of guidelines and publications that 
themselves conflates various lived experiences and meanings.  
 
Firstly, investigating case law in which gender is a component, I demonstrate the struggle 
of taking up a place within refugee law in terms of gender. Despite the existence of UN 
guidelines and scholarly literature on how to conduct gender sensitive readings of the 
refugee Convention, inconsistency, irregularity and a sense of arbitrariness persists within 
case law, as gender is read and interpreted differently from court to court. That is, the 
ambiguity of the gender concept and related terms create much leeway for states, courts, 
and judges to apply differing and arbitrary readings of the law. The considerable room 
that a ambiguous gender concept leaves for interpretation is significant, I argue, because 
in order to be “heard” by the law, women claimants in particular have to navigate 
different “scripts” through which to narrate their experiences of persecution, depending 
on the various courts’ understanding of gender. I thus argue that those fleeing gender-
related persecution lack a place in a double sense; both in terms of having left one’s 
country, and in lacking a grammatical “space” within refugee law.  
 
Secondly, and despite the challenges outlined above, I also argue that the very 
irregularity with which courts apply and interpret refugee guidelines and law in fact 
create room for resistance. That is, precisely because human rights and law are 
disciplines where language, narration, definition, and interpretation are central 
components, individual cases represent a space, or a moment, in which people may 
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challenge and develop understandings of gender within refugee law. Claimants and 
advocates have some room in compelling courts to recognize intersectionality, for 
instance, when it is not contained within human rights guidelines and instruments.  
 
Finally, drawing on the notion that power operates through language and interpretation, I 
outline some practical implications for those seeking to advance gender equality within 
international refugee law. Using the insight of Slaughter (1997) and Shaffer and Smith 
(2004) that human rights can be productively understood in terms of narration and 
narrative voices, I argue that studies of language and discourse are crucial in uncovering 
the ability of different social groups to narrate their experiences of persecution to and 
within the law. When understanding human rights in terms of narratives and voices, 
having a claim to the law or a voice as a legal subject means that one is able to narrate 
one’s experiences and identity in ways that are recognizable in and to law. Understanding 
the vocabulary available to refugees is therefore crucial in order to work for just 
recognition before the law. I ultimately argue that the solution to creating a more gender-
inclusive refugee law does not lie in merely changing the words, terms, or language of 
refugee laws and instruments, because language may always be interpreted in ways that 
privileges certain perspectives and excludes others. Rather, the question of gender 
equality within refugee protection is multi-faceted and complex, and requires cross-
disciplinary approach that simultaneously analyzes, challenges, and develops language 
used to express gender; reads for the power embedded in the process of interpreting the 
language of laws; works for greater consistency, transparency, and accountability 
throughout this process; and strives for more equitable representation within institutions, 
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in terms of a greater gender-balance within human rights organizations and domestic 
juridical structures.  
 
5.A. Case Law 
In doing a close reading of the Guidelines I have outlined the ways that gender is 
understood and constructed as a concept. In this section, I take a closer look at the more 
practical implications of how the concept of gender is interpreted, and at the question of 
what it means to make a claim to the law in terms of gender. I focus, first, on cases in 
which gender has been relevant in formulating a particular social group (PSG), in order to 
address how gender is constituted in and through the PSG category. I choose to look at 
the relationship between gender and the PSG concept because gender arguably comes 
closest to constituting a separate nexus when it is formulated as a basis for a particular 
social group, and as such, it is the PSG ground that provides the framework for cases 
where gender is framed as the sole ground for persecution. The PSG ground is 
increasingly becoming the default way to treat women claimants (Edwards, 2010: 28), 
and because a large part of gender-related claims are likely to be treated in relation to the 
PSG category, it is particularly important to look how this relation is understood within 
case law. I also address trends in decision-making in cases of domestic abuse and female 
genital cutting, in order to demonstrate that whether violence against women is 
interpreted as a human rights violation depends on gendered and racialized readings of 
the law.   
 
In order to look at some trends in decision making invoking the particular social group 
(PSG) ground, I have chosen the cases of “Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, 
exparte Shah; Islam and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department” (hereafter 
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Shah and Islam), and “In Re R-A.-“ (hereafter R-A-), as these have been ground-breaking 
cases in the U.K. and U.S. context respectively. In Shah and Islam, the UK House of 
Lords granted asylum in 1999 to two Pakistani women fleeing severe domestic abuse 
were granted asylum in the U.K., based on their membership in a PSG consisting of 
“Pakistani women.” In the case of R-A-, Rodi Alvarado fought for asylum in the U.S. 
over the course of many years, after fleeing from a husband who beat and raped her on a 
regular basis. Ultimately, Alvarado “received asylum in a non-precedential decision 
based on her membership in the particular social group of ‘married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave the relationship’” (Lobo: 2013: 376). In accepting the broad 
category of “Pakistani women” as constituting a PSG, Shah and Islam set precedent in 
allowing for the broad category of “women” in a society to be recognized as a PSG, is in 
line with the reasoning of the UNHCR Guidelines. Several similar cases have been 
approved in the time since (Lobo, 2013: 374). This broad approach to gender and the 
PSG nexus stands in contrast to the more narrow “gender-plus” approach, in which a 
PSG should be defined by gender plus some other limiting characteristics, “such as 
beliefs, relationships to the persecutor, or attempted escape” (Fletcher, 2006: 118). The 
PSG articulated in the U.S. case of R-A- , for example, reads as “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.” When it comes to U.S. case law 
generally, courts and decision-makers have been hesitant to articulate social groups based 
on “women” in a given society without any additional qualifiers (Lobo, 2013: 368), 
making the “gender-plus” approach a strategy more likely to succeed in U.S. courts 
(Fletcher, 2006: 118). Depending on the court in which a claimant seeks asylum, then, the 
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claimant must articulate her gender identity, and the way that her gender was a 
contributing reason for the persecution, in different ways in order to be successful. 
 
This difference in terms of how gender is thought to constitute a PSG has implications for 
women claimants, because they run into different challenges depending on the approach 
taken in each specific court. The approach of accepting “women” in a society as a PSG 
may be beneficial to women claimants in that it highlights the ways violence against 
women tends to be the structural and interconnected with other forms of harm, which 
facilitates a more holistic consideration of gender-related and gender-specific claims 
(Lobo, 2013: 404). However, this approach has also been interpreted in ways that places 
additional burden upon women claimants. Lobo (2013) describes a development where 
courts do not merely accept that the claimant establishes her own fear of persecution in 
the context of inadequate state protection, but also require her to establish that the same is 
true for the larger social group of “women” in a specific society, whom she claims her 
persecution is grounded in (373). A woman must, in other words, both establish 
discrimination against herself and against the social group of women in her society, 
whereas “applicants claiming racial or religious persecution (for instance) need only 
show an individualized well-founded fear of persecution, not harm to their entire group” 
(Lobo, 2013: 373). The interpretation of “women” as a PSG, then, may lead courts to 
subject women to a double burden of proof because they are required to demonstrate two 
failures of state protection, both in protecting her and the women in her society at large 
(2013: 373). In the 2003 case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v. ZH, for 
example, an Iranian woman fled to the U.K. after having suffered domestic violence, and 
even though the court did find that Iranian women are discriminated against “in their 
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personal status” (para. 75), they rejected that “Iranian women” were persecuted as a 
group, as they were treated better than the group of “Pakistani women” relevant in the 
Shah and Islam case (para. 79-80). This demonstrates that even where case law and 
practice is in agreement with the general provisions of the Guidelines, the application of 
“women” as a PSG could lead to women being read by the law primarily as group 
members, whose refugee status is dependent on the situation of her social group, rather 
than her individual situation.  
 
As opposed to framing “women” as a PSG, a gender-plus approach rather singles out one 
specific manifestation of women’s subordination, and treats it in isolation. While this 
approach may read women more like individuals than group members, it may also negate 
the structural and interconnected nature of gendered violence, as applicants are forced to 
articulate their experiences on a case-by-case basis (Lobo, 2013: 378). Because the 
structural nature of violence against women is lost when a “new” and specific PSG is 
formulated in each case, individuals may struggle to have their experiences recognized as 
persecution and as human rights violations. In the words of Lobo: “[s]ince adjudicators 
are less likely to grant asylum claims based on isolated harms, non-recognition of women 
as a particular social group inhibits the Convention’s mandate to protect victims of 
gender persecution” (2013: 368). The articulation of a new PSG in each case furthermore 
leaves little room for any stable guidelines outlining the concrete definition of what an 
accepted PSG looks like. In analyzing of over 206 outcomes in domestic violence cases 
in the U.S., Blaine Bookey finds “contradictory and arbitrary outcomes” in how the PSG 
concept is interpreted and applied, despite a development towards somewhat greater 
consistency (2013: 147). The study illustrates this point by comparing two seemingly 
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similar domestic violence cases, in which “judges agreed that the women testified 
credibly, that the harm they suffered rose to the level of persecution, and that their 
governments had failed to protect them” (Bookey, 2013: 108). Yet, in one case asylum 
was granted on the grounds of membership in the particular social group of “Salvadorian 
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” (Bookey, 2013: 108) whereas 
courts decided in the second case that “a group defined by gender, nationality, and status 
in a domestic relationship is not cognizable under the law” (108). Based on this 
irregularity, Bookey argues that “the absence of binding norms remains a major 
impediment to fair and consistent outcomes for women who fear return to countries 
where they confront unimaginable harms, or worse, death” (2013: 110). 
 
When it comes to violence against women as human rights violation, further 
inconsistency exists, depending on different courts’ interpretation of gender and race. 
In comparing 645 Canadian asylum cases involving domestic violence, forced 
sterilization, and female genital cutting (FGC), Efrat Arbel (2013) finds that adjudicators 
are consistent in identifying FGC and forced sterilization as rights violations, and the 
women subjected to such practices as a victim of a persecutory practice (2013: 731-732). 
On the other hand, domestic abuse is seldom seen as rights violations in itself, and 
claimants in such cases rarely understood as a victims of human rights violations. “That 
is,” argues Arbel, “adjudicators generally recognized domestic violence claimants as 
refugees not because they were victims of persecutory practices but because they were 
victims of persecutory cultures,” (2013: 732). In other words, they are rather seen as 
victims of their own, discriminatory cultures, rather than structural human rights abuse. 
Arbel further hypothesizes that this both stems from and reflects what he calls “a 
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defensive anxiety” (2013: 732), in that practices such as FGC and forced sterilization are 
seen as “exotic” in the Canadian context – and therefore easier to acknowledge as human 
rights violations. Domestic violence, on the other hand, is common in Canada and 
therefore a more familiar form of violence, which makes it more problematic to label it as 
a rights violation, as that would be synonymous with acknowledging that human rights 
abuses also take place in the Canadian context. Domestic violence might in other words 
be more easily accepted as manifestations of the systematic subordination of women 
when it happens “over there,” and therefore because of some cultural difference. This 
entails specific notions about gender, culture, and about what it means to be a “woman” 
in specific contexts. The approach taken in Canadian courts, argues Arbel, constructs 
non-western culture “as a place where domestic violence occurs because of the so-called 
‘inherent’ vulnerability of the women located in that cultural milieu” (732). Thus, women 
fleeing from FGC may successfully frame their experiences as human rights violations, 
whereas women suffering domestic abuse are more likely to succeed if formulating their 
claims in terms of their inherent vulnerability and cultural subordination. This, in turn, 
“erects legal and conceptual barriers for women who cannot authentically narrate their 
experience through the script of cultural vulnerability or who cannot present as ‘victims 
of culture’” (729).  
 
Similarly to the point made by Arbel, Fletcher (2006) argues that adjudicators in the U.S. 
context hesitate to grant refugee status in cases where the gender-related violence is 
similar to forms of violence that are familiar. Or put another way, because of “racial and 
gender stereotypes,” adjudicators more readily accept gender-related claims based on 
practices that appear “foreign” or non-Western (Fletcher, 2006: 118), such as FGC or 
  
96 
forced sterilization. There might be a parallel here to the point made earlier in this paper, 
that scholars find that adjudicators are more prone to accept arguments based on 
women’s physical vulnerability – as in the case of FGC – than claims based on their 
active resistance to prescribed roles and restraints (Fitzpatrick, 1997: 44).  
 
What this overview of some trends and tendencies within case law illustrates, then, is the 
difficulties women claimants face in articulating their experiences of gender-based 
persecution within refugee law. The lack of a coherent and binding norms mean that 
outcomes are inconsistent, and heavily reliant on individual courts and judges. Women 
claimants, in particular, have to manage different scripts, or narratives, in asserting their 
claims – they have to represent themselves and their experiences in and through specific 
terms and vocabularies – depending on the context they apply within. Such legal and 
conceptual barriers imply that individuals fleeing from gender-related persecution can be 
seen as lacking a place in a dual sense; both in having to leave their home country, and in 
lacking a grammatical space within law, not having a vocabulary with and through which 
to narrate their experiences and identities in a way that is recognized by law. The fact that 
approaches to, and interpretations of, gender differ from nation to nation, demonstrates 
the power each state has to interpret the relationship between gender and the refugee 
standing. This point demonstrates the continued significance of the first exigency 
outlined in the introduction, as individual states and courts retain autonomy in applying 
specific interpretation of international law. 
 
However, this discrepancy between refugee instruments and law, on the one hand, and 
case law on the other, also demonstrates that there is considerable room in individual 
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cases to challenge dominant interpretations of gender within refugee law. Precisely 
because the gender concept is ambiguous, claimants and advocates may construct new 
and progressive formulations of the relationship between gender and the refugee 
definition. Additionally, the question of how gender relates to the refugee concept is part 
of an ongoing discussion, and scholars and practitioners continue to monitor and 
challenge decision made in court. This means that individuals have room to contribute to 
a more nuanced understanding of gender within refugee law – one that recognized 
intersectionality, for instance.    
 
5.B. Concluding Remarks: Human Rights as Narratives 
In the ensuing discussion, I build on this argument by looking at the benefits of viewing 
human rights in terms of narratives and narrative voices. Throughout this paper, focus has 
been on language as a tool of power and the ways that language and discourse has 
historically worked to exclude certain social groups from the protection of human rights 
instruments. I have, for instance, reviewed literature arguing that the exclusion of 
women’s experiences stems from the ways the language of the refugee Convention has 
been interpreted from a male (and heteronormative) perspective. I have analyzed 
UNHCR’s own guidelines on how to conduct gender-inclusive readings of the law, 
arguing that even the Guidelines falters in establishing the words to accurately represent 
and express gender-experiences and identities, and ultimately treats gender as a stable, or 
fixed ground. Overviewing case law has worked to demonstrate the challenges facing 
those asserting gender-related claims to asylum, in which the lack of clarity around 
concepts such as “gender” and “particular social group” leaves much leeway for courts to 
apply limited understandings of gender-related violence and persecution. What this last 
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section does, then, is to turn to the notion that human rights can be recast as personal 
narration and narrative voices; that “human rights function as narrative constructions” 
(Slaughter, 1997: 407). I assert that the focus on voice and narration within human rights 
law points to issues of representation, that is, of who decides and delineates what 
vocabulary is recognized within law. Substituting one gender-word for another is not 
likely to have a great impact as long as the people reading and interpreting the terms 
remain the same. Women’s rights activists and scholars of international studies should, 
therefore, take a multifaceted, cross-disciplinary approach, in order to work for a more 
equitable representation of women and minorities within human rights instruments. 
 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, language and the personal narrative have a 
central place within human rights law. After all, in order to access the refugee status and 
be recognized by the law, an individual must articulate her experiences of persecution as 
they are shaped by her identity and circumstances. Shaffer and Smith argue that the life 
narrative is not only a key component within law, but has become “one of the most potent 
vehicles” for advancing claims within the human rights regime in general (2004: 1). The 
norms, instruments, and discourses of human rights, argue Shaffer and Smith, are indeed 
dependent upon an “international commitment to narratability” (3); human rights law is 
committed  “to the voice, as the tool to guarantee recourse to individual narration,” in the 
words of Slaughter (1997: 429). The voice, the ability to articulate and narrate one’s 
experiences and identity, becomes the core of human rights protection – a system which 
is activated when individuals “[tell] their stories to human rights advocates working for 
NGOs, [testify] before national inquiries and official or quasi-official tribunals, and 
[present] their stories to the court of world opinion” (Shaffer and Smith, 2004: 3). It is 
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such testimony, such personal narratives, that “brings into play, implicitly or explicitly, a 
rights claim” (Shaffer and Smith, 2004: 3). Thus, Slaughter asserts the human rights 
regime is committed to protecting the voice of a presumed self-narrating subject and its 
ability to articulate narratives of identity (1997).  
 
In this sense, human rights violations can be understood as attacks on the human voice – 
as attempts to silence the individual. Slaughter gives the example of torture, which can be 
recast as an attempt to silence, or distort, the voice of the victim, in forcing her to admit 
to lies, while taking away her ability to coherently narrate her story or identity. By 
forcing the tortured to speak, and to make irrational statements, the torture also becomes 
a language in itself, in that the act “produces a voice that makes claims about the power 
of the torturer and the torturing state” (Slaughter, 1997: 427). The colonization project of 
Western states can similarly be understood in terms of attempting to destroy the voice of 
a people, and the socio-cultural context that enables their narratives. People were 
deprived of the right to articulate the story about their own identity and history, as it was 
replaced by the voice and perspective of the colonizing hegemon: “[t]he destruction of 
the voice that finds itself and speaks itself, the voice that offers the counter-narrative of 
the ‘Third World’ subject, is precisely the homogenizing project of colonialism” 
(Slaughter, 1997: 419).  
 
The benefits of a human rights concept that focuses on the  “the voice of the juridical 
subject and the possibility of narration,” argues Slaughter, is that it “allows for a 
conception of human rights that does not rely upon some essential, inherent human 
quality” (1997: 412). Rather, the focus on narration allows for a more flexible and fluid 
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notion of human rights, in which the terms of narration are temporally and culturally 
specific and adaptable to the changing contexts of different lived experiences. Thus, 
argues Slaughter, “as conceptions of the speaking subject change, whether over time or 
across cultures, so too must conceptions of human rights that guarantee the subject’s 
ability to narrate herself” (1997: 412). Put differently, an inquiry into various conceptions 
of the speaking subject and her conditions is necessary in order to judge, or evaluate, 
human rights responses implemented to protect her voice. In Slaughter’s words, “as we 
better understand what a subject needs to be able to tell her story, we can evaluate 
entitlements and prohibitions for their effectiveness in guaranteeing the ability to self-
narrate” (1997: 430).  
 
Along the lines of such a project that investigates “what the subject needs to tell her 
story,” I have argued that an inquiry into the discourse of human right laws, and the terms 
with which refugees may articulate gender-related claims, is of major importance in 
working for a more equitable refugee protection regime. The analysis conducted in this 
thesis seeks to contribute to such a discussion of the terms and conditions with which one 
may narrate experiences of persecution in terms of gender, and have one’s claim be 
recognized by law. I have argued that refugees fleeing gender-related persecution find 
themselves in a situation of lacking a place in a double sense, both in having fled their 
home country, and in lacking a grammatical space within refugee law where gender is 
recognized in a coherent and predictable way. Grounding my research in literature on the 
ways language and interpretation has worked to exclude women’s experiences from the 
protection of refugee law, I have argued that also the UNHCR Guidelines fails to provide 
an accurate vocabulary with which to articulate gender within law. Using case law, I have 
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illustrated that women claimants in particular have to navigate different “scripts” – that 
is, different vocabularies with and through which they cast and represent their identities 
and experiences in terms of gender. This because courts recognize certain narratives 
while rejecting others, depending on how concepts such as gender, race, and PSGs are 
constructed and interpreted. As case law illustrates, certain courts and judges enable the 
narrative of the victimized woman, for instance, oppressed by her culture and inherent 
weakness, while others recognize the articulation of violence against women as a 
structural form of human rights violation. 
 
Based on the inquiry conducted in this thesis, then, I argue that in order to advance 
gender equality within refugee law, it is important to take a broad, cross-disciplinary 
approach. That is, barriers to the equal inclusion and protection of different social groups 
are rooted in various fields such as law, linguistics, politics, and human rights theory, 
amongst others. A comprehensive approach should focus on the conditions for people to 
narrate their experiences in terms of gender, and how such narratives are received within 
law.  Firstly, analyzing the discourse and language of law and human rights institutions 
should remain an important practice for feminists and scholars of international relations. 
Continued attention should be paid to the ways international rights discourse enables and 
limits narratives of gendered persecution. Secondly, the close reading of the Guidelines 
has demonstrated that in reading internationally applicable definitions, laws, and 
recommendations, states and courts retain freedom and power in interpreting these 
formulations. This points back to the theoretical fundament of close reading, that 
language and reading are inherently social, and power-laden, activities. Given the 
impossibility of pinning down the language of gender to mean one thing within law, and 
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the room always left to interpretation, the position taken in this thesis is that it is not 
sufficient to substitute existing language with other terms and words in order to rectify 
the exclusion of women’s point of view. Rather, scholars and practitioners should work 
for systematic ways to read for power and bias in the implementation of law, and to 
achieve transparency and accountability in this process, in order to develop a more 
coherent and equitable refugee law. Enabling practitioners to better read, and therefore 
challenge, how gender is constructed in law, would also allow them to formulate 
arguments that may expand and contest dominant understandings of gender. This would 
in turn make law more adaptable to the particularity and context-bound nature of gender-
related cases. Thirdly, reframing of human rights as narratives compels us to recognize 
not only the words available tell such narratives, but also who is able to interpret and 
judge such narratives. In the words of Slaughter, “[t]he right to narration is not merely the 
right to tell one’s story, it is the right to control representation” (430). Considering the 
power embedded in reading and interpreting language, I therefore argue that a holistic 
approach – that is, an approach that takes a cross-sisciplinary blabla, eller, that considers 
the ways exclusion of gender/women happen on multiple levels, in and through multiple 
interconnected fileds – also address the unequal representation of women within legal and 
human rights institutions. It is important to recognize the considerable power embedded 
in holding such positions, and steps should be taken in achieving a more equitable gender 
balance, both within human rights institutions, and within domestic legal structures.   
 
What this thesis demonstrates is that inquiry into legal language is inherently tied to 
questions of interpretation and of who interprets, as well as about the institutional 
structure such interpretation happens within. This implies that the two different feminist 
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approaches to how we can include gender within refugee law – via gender-sensitive 
interpretation versus textual modification of the refugee definition – may not be as 
different as they might appear. What both of the sides teaches us is that the act of reading 
law, in terms of interpretation and application, should be watched closely, in order to 
uncover the ways such readings are in fact engaging in discursive constructions of 
categories such as gender. The case of international refugee law points our attention to 
the importance of having a conversation not only about how a text might be read, but also 
about who is able to interpret, and how the acts of reading or interpretation can never be 
“divorced” from the interpreter and the context he or she is acting within. For scholars 
interested in gender equality and international law, this demonstrates that we should not 
only ask the question of whether or how to formally include women within the scope of 
policy and law – we should also engage in debate on what such inclusion should look 
like, what it means for women to participate or be included on equal footing with men, 
and, most importantly, in what language and terms such inclusion might appear.   
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